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Preface
This FAC Working Paper is part of the first phase of a collab-
orative research project of the Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) Theme of the Future Agricultures 
Consortium (FAC). It was funded through a grant from 
the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). The project explored the political economy of 
cereal seed systems across five distinct country contexts 
– Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Zimbabwe – during 
2009-10. The evolution of seed research and develop-
ment programmes and processes has varied greatly 
across these countries. In each case, a unique set of public 
and private actors and interests has been involved in 
defining priorities in seed policy and implementing proj-
ects, each seeking to influence those agendas to their 
advantage. Moreover, each country has a different reli-
ance on ‘modern’ hybrid (or sometimes biotech) varieties 
and associated R&D and supply systems and an inde-
pendent informal sector, involving networks of farmer 
experimenters and seed bulkers and suppliers, with 
varying degrees of capacity.
As calls for a ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’ gain 
momentum, the focus on seeds and seed systems is rising 
up the agricultural policy agenda. Much of the debate 
stresses the technological or market dimensions, with 
substantial investments being made in seed improve-
ment and the development of both public and private 
sector delivery systems. But there is currently much less 
emphasis on the wider policy dimensions – and particu-
larly the political economy of policymaking in these 
diverse agricultural contexts.
Experience tells us it is these factors that often make 
or break even the best designed and most well inten-
tioned intervention. And since investment in seed 
improvement and supply was last emphasised as a major 
priority in agriculture (in the 1970s and 80s), contexts 
have changed dramatically. The collapse of national 
public sector breeding systems has been dramatic, and 
this has only partially been compensated for by the selec-
tive entry of the private sector. Large multinational seed 
and agricultural supply companies are increasingly domi-
nating the global scene, and there are many claims made 
about the promises of new technologies (notably trans-
genics) transforming the seed sector through a techno-
logical revolution. While informal breeding and seed 
supply systems continue to exist, and indeed have been 
extensively supported through NGOs and other civil 
society groups, they are often under pressure, as drought, 
corruption and conflict take their toll and economic 
transformation and livelihood change continues apace, 
or they are ignored or excluded from policy circles.
The focus on cereal seed systems allowed this project 
to concentrate on a similar set of crops across the five 
study countries with a key influence on food security at 
household and national levels. Given the political rever-
berations of the ‘food crisis’ of 2007-08, this enabled 
timely analysis of the implications of the policy processes 
shaping the breeding, production, marketing and distri-
bution of cereal seeds. As this FAC Working Paper shows, 
whether grown for local subsistence or traded commer-
cially, the significance of cereal crops to national politics 
(and therefore arguments about food security and sover-
eignty), commercial interests and local livelihoods is 
profound.
To gain clear insights into the policy actors, networks, 
interests and narratives at play, this project sought to 
test the hypothesis that contrasting politics and different 
configurations of interests will affect the way cereal seed 
systems operate and shape how a ‘New Green Revolution’ 
will ultimately play out. As such, the five country studies 
analysed their respective national seed policy processes 
by asking:
 • How do seed policies get created, and by whom? 
 • How do ideas about what makes a ‘good seed policy’ 
change over time?
 • How are boundaries drawn around seed problems and 
policy ‘storylines’ elaborated? 
 • Whose voices are taken into account in the seed policy 
process? And whose are excluded? 
 • What spaces exist for new ideas, actors and networks? 
How can these be opened up?
The underlying implication in all these cases is that 
politics matter and that by engaging critically with seed 
policy processes, we can begin to define and then delib-
erate among different framings and interests to shift the 
focus of the debate beyond the usual technical/market 
fix.
John Thompson and Ian Scoones, Project Co-ordinators 
(August 2010)
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Abstract
This paper provides a critical account of the cereal seed 
systems in Malawi both in a historical and contemporary 
context with particular reference to the three input 
support programmes implemented since the late 1990s 
to date. The main argument of this paper is that the 
centrality of the question of food security in the country’s 
electoral politics in a post liberalisation context has 
created a seed industry dominated by multinational seed 
companies, offering farmers a narrow range of products 
mainly hybrid maize, and in which alternative cereal seed 
systems such as millet and sorghum are at the verge of 
extinction. The commercial interests of the multinational 
seed companies are propped by donors who are obsessed 
with promoting a vibrant private sector input supply 
system as an engine of a sustainable green revolution 
through input support programmes. This has invariably 
privileged the genetic material supplied by the multina-
tional seed companies at the expense of the national 
breeding programme whose main client are the local 
seed companies controlling only 10 percent of the seed 
market. The government’s fixation on food security has 
also contributed to privileging the genetic material from 
multinational seed companies since they are deemed 
to be high yielding even though at the expense of the 
seed supply variety to the farmer. The interests of seed 
companies, donors and government have, even though 
for different reasons, coincided to create a seed industry 
that has a very narrow product portfolio, distributes 
benefits to a very small proportion of the population 
through various forms of commercial ventures and 
schemes of political patronage buoyed by excessive 
weaknesses in the regulatory framework for the seed 
industry. This paper therefore demonstrates that policy 
processes are predominantly characterised by the clash 
of competing and conflicting interests and viewpoints 
rather than impartial, disinterested or objective search 
for correct solutions for policy issues. However, the voices 
and views of the dominant coalitions almost always 
shape the major policy directions. The major recommen-
dations for revitalising the seed industry include: 
1.  improving the efficiency and implementation of regu-
latory frameworks; 
2.  enhancing public sector breeding and dissemination 
of improved varieties; and 
3.  creating an enabling environment to stimulate local 
seed enterprises that can deliver products with the 
needs of the smallholder farmer in mind.
1. Setting the Context
This paper is inspired by the forceful comeback of agri-
culture onto the international development agenda after 
decades of crisis and neglect as a promising avenue for 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction 
particularly in Africa (Draper et al. 2009, Cook 2009). For 
more than two consecutive decades, African agriculture 
hit the headlines more for failures than successes, exac-
erbated by prolonged periods of underinvestment and 
poor policies for smallholder farmers who form the bulk 
of the farming population. In particular, structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) were disastrous as ‘they 
replaced one badly run model with almost nothing; 
[creating a situation in which] everything an African 
farmer needs-seeds, fertiliser, public investment in irriga-
tion and extension services-remains beyond her grasp’ 
(Adesina 2009: 1). In Africa, the revival of agriculture as 
a leading strategic sector is underpinned by political 
commitment at the highest political and policy levels 
within the framework of the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). African 
governments have committed themselves to invest at 
least 10 percent of their national budgets into agriculture, 
the goal being to achieve and sustain growth at a 
minimum level of 6 percent which is required to achieve 
agricultural led socio-economic growth.
However, agricultural development is hugely depen-
dent on smallholder farmers’ access to inputs amongst 
which quality seed is extremely critical since ‘the genetic 
information contained in the seed sets the ultimate limit 
on the levels of crop productivity’ (Zerbe 2001: 657). 
Actually, seed is perhaps the most important determinant 
of crop success or failure alongside fertiliser and water. 
Consequently, seed systems, understood as the entire 
complex web of organisations, individuals and institu-
tions associated with the development, multiplication, 
processing, storage, distribution and marketing of seeds, 
are important components of any efforts to revive agri-
cultural production (Cromwell 1991; AGRA 2009). Seed 
systems can be formal or informal and a well functioning 
seed system is characterised as ‘the one that has the 
appropriate combination of formal, informal, market and 
non-market channels to stimulate and effectively meet 
farmers evolving demand for quality seeds’ (Howard et 
al. 2001: 3). Seed systems further entail legal consider-
ations such as variety release procedures, intellectual 
property rights, certification programmes, seed stan-
dards, contract laws, and law enforcement.
In the Malawi context, the configuration of maize 
politics has created a strong actor network, including 
major donor aid agencies, which favours international 
commercial players and their genetic material in the seed 
sector over local producers, and local varieties. 
Notwithstanding the strong narrative about national 
food security or public good aid, the benefits are unevenly 
distributed, with most accruing to the elites in both 
national and donor led interventions. Malawi is an inter-
esting case because of its experiences in recent years in 
which maize ‘has become a political crop on which 
depends the food security of the whole country’ (JAICAF 
2008: 35). This simply re-echoes rather familiar senti-
ments that ‘agricultural production is central to the 
political economy of southern Africa’ (Zerbe 2001: 657). 
The apparent prominence of maize in the country’s 
political economy is inevitable due to frequent episodes 
of chronic food insecurity since the turn of the 1990s. 
This eventually saw the country shift from being nation-
ally self-sufficient in maize in non-drought years to being 
dependent on food aid and commercial imports 
(Devereux 2002; Chinsinga 2004). The capacity of the 
country to feed itself was decimated, inter alia, by regular 
bouts of flash floods and droughts, removal of fertiliser 
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and hybrid maize seed subsidies and sharp devaluation 
of the local currency that made farm inputs virtually 
unaffordable to the majority of the chronically impov-
erished smallholder farmers.
The precarious food security situation prompted 
several concerted responses from government with 
support from donors to deal with, and ultimately work 
out how to insulate the country from pervasive chronic 
food insecurity. Since the late 1990s, the major initiatives 
have included Starter Pack (SP) (1998-2000); Targeted 
Input Programme (TIP) (2001-2005); and Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) (2005-todate) (Levy 
2005; Chinsinga 2007; Dorward et al. 2007). The produc-
tivity impact of AISP has made Malawi the focus of inter-
national attention as a result of high profile coverage in 
the international press. AISP’s productivity impact has 
been unprecedented. For four consecutive growing 
seasons, Malawi has consistently enjoyed substantial 
maize surplus over and above its annual national require-
ment estimated at 2.1 million metric tonnes. In the 2006/7 
growing season, for instance, Malawi achieved a 53 
percent surplus from a 43 percent national food deficit 
in 2005, some of which was exported to neighbouring 
countries. The New York Times applauded Malawi for 
‘ending famine [by] simply ignoring experts’ (Dugger 
2007); the UK Guardian carried a piece on Malawi’s green 
revolution arguing ‘Africa’s green revolution may be 
several steps nearer after a pioneering experiment in 
seed and fertiliser subsidies to smallholders in Malawi’ 
(Perkins 2009) ; and AGRA (2009: 2) touted Malawi as ‘a 
model of success showing the rest of the African govern-
ments the way towards a sustainable version of the 
African Green Revolution’.
This paper therefore provides a critical account of how 
the cereal seed system has evolved as an integral part 
of Malawi’s twenty-first century “maize miracle” using a 
political economy conceptual framework. The framework 
emphasises the importance of understanding the polit-
ical, economic and social processes that promote or block 
pro-poor change, and to understand the role of institu-
tions, power and the underlying context for policy 
processes (Synder 2005; DFID 2009). The approach used 
here highlights the dynamic interaction between narra-
tives, actor/networks and politics/interests, positing that 
the way in which policies are talked about and the associ-
ated values, power relations and politics frame policies 
in a particular way (IDS 2006; Keeley and Scoones 2003). 
Key political economy questions about seeds and 
subsides include:
 • How do policies about seeds and subsidies get created, 
by whom and in what ways?
 • How do ideas about what make ‘good’ policies about 
seeds and subsidies evolve and change?
 • How are boundaries drawn around problems and 
policy storylines elaborated about seeds and 
subsidies?
 • Whose voices and views are taken into account in the 
policy process about seeds and subsidies? And what/
who is excluded?
 • What spaces exist for new ideas, actors, networks in 
the seeds and subsidies? How can these be opened 
up? 
Actors thus coalesce around different policy narratives, 
forming networks across organizations and between 
groups of people-academics, think tanks, donors, govern-
ment agencies and others. This means that policy 
engagement is not only about gathering new evidence 
but about creating new alliances, networks and political 
configurations (Scoones 2005; Cabral and Scoones 2006). 
Strategic engagement with seemingly dominant narra-
tives may therefore open up new opportunities for alter-
native perspectives on defining problems on the policy 
agenda and how they can be dealt with. Thus contrary 
to the highly stylised traditional perspective, policy 
process is less of a linear sequence but more of a political 
process underpinned by a complex mesh of interactions 
and ramifications between a wide range of stakeholders 
who are driven and constrained by competing interests 
and the contexts in which they operate. 
Policy processes can thus be adversarial, characterised 
by the clash of competing interests and viewpoints rather 
than impartial, disinterested, or objective search for 
correct solutions for policy issues. This means that the 
making and shaping of policy is less a set of organised, 
predictable and rational choices than a complex, often 
unpredictable and above all, political process. In agricul-
tural research, this implies that focus on people, ideas, 
institutions, processes and politics must take precedence 
over the rush in selecting technologies and investment 
projects (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2008). 
To critically interrogate the political economy of seeds 
and subsidies in Malawi, the paper uses three input 
programmes that have been implemented since the late 
1990s. These include the SP, TIP and AISP. These input 
programmes are ideal for this purpose because they do 
not only demonstrate how different narratives, actors 
and interests have coalesced but also a change in 
response to the realignment and reconfiguration of the 
dynamics in the wider political economy. The details of 
these input support programmes are provided in Box 1.
This study adopted a historical approach to trace 
changes in the way narratives, networks and politics 
about the seeds and subsidies have been framed, exam-
ining the shifts, contestations and contradictions in the 
narratives about what the problem is and what should 
be done about it over time through lens of the input 
support programmes as described above. It was carried 
out with the help of two research assistants who hold 
MA and BA degrees in Political Science respectively1. 
These RAs have vast experience in carrying qualitative 
research using a wide range of methodologies. 
Nonetheless, prior to the fieldwork, the research assis-
tants were trained on the political economy approach 
to understanding policy processes with particular 
emphasis on the framework that was used for this study. 
The field work was divided into three main phases 
spanning between October and December 2009. The 
first phase, carried out in October 2009, focused on inter-
views with donor agencies, seed companies and govern-
ment officials at headquarters’ level. The second phase 
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was carried out in November 2009 and entailed inter-
views with both local and international NGOs based in 
Lilongwe that are in one way or another involved with 
seed sector while the third and final phase of fieldwork 
was carried out in December 2009. This involved key 
informant interviews with government, NGO and private 
sector officials at district level and focus group discus-
sions (FGDs) at the local level.
The study involved some 45 interviews with key stake-
holders from government policy makers to public/
private, national and international researchers to donors, 
commercial seed suppliers and traders to farmers at 
national, district and local levels. At the latter levels, the 
fieldwork was done in Dedza district in central Malawi, 
widely considered as one of the key agricultural districts 
across the country. Key informant interviews were carried 
out with Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS) officials at district and local levels, private sector 
actors especially agro-dealers and officials from several 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in the 
agricultural sector. 
Eight focus group discussions were carried out with 
farmers in the villages of Kadam’manja and Mkumgumbe, 
four in each village respectively in Bembeke Extension 
Planning Area (EPA). The FGDs, consisting of between 
8-12 people, were conducted in separate groups of men, 
women, youth (girls and boys mixed) and men and 
women (mixed). The rationale was to capture views about 
the dynamics of the cereal seed systems from various 
segments of local communities but perhaps more criti-
cally to triangulate local perceptions with the wider 
debate (s) at district and national levels. While it is 
acknowledged that insights from two villages in Bembeke 
EPA can hardly be representative of the national picture, 
these seemingly localised experiences could potentially 
be indicative of much more general sets of deficiencies, 
challenges, constraints and even opportunities at a much 
broader scale.
Following this introduction, the next section examines 
the historical and contemporary context of cereal seed 
systems in Malawi. The main focus is on the institutional 
developments that have taken place since the advent 
of independence especially in terms of how these devel-
opments have affected the progressive development of 
the cereal seed systems. The status of the national 
breeding programme is examined with particular refer-
ence to the changing operative institutional context 
instigated by the liberalisation of the seed industry that 
has led to the increase of actors in the seed industry both 
local and international. Consequently, the contemporary 
configuration of the seed industry is examined through 
the political economy lenses paying particular attention 
to who are the key actors, their narratives, interests and 
patterns of engagement as well as the key policy issues 
and debates that have significant bearing on seeds and 
subsidies in Malawi. The third section delineates the 
political economy dynamics of the seeds and subsidies 
through the three input support programmes focusing 
on how different narratives, actors and interests have 
coalesced but also changed as these input programmes 
have evolved over time. The fourth and final section offers 
some concluding reflections with particular focus on 
lessons learnt about seeds and subsidies in Malawi.
Starter Pack (1998-00)
The Starter Pack (SP) programme provided inputs to smallholder farmers adequate for 0.1ha. These inputs were 
extended to all farming families estimated at 2.86 million. The input pack included 2kg of hybrid maize, 2kg of nitrogen 
legume, 10kg of basal fertiliser and 5kg of top dressing and illustrated instructions (Blackie and Mann 2005).
Targeted Input Programme (TIP) (2001-4)
The Targeted Input Programme (TIP) was a scaled down version of SP as an integral part of an exit strategy. It initially 
targeted about 1.5 million farming families which would over time be progressively scaled down to 350,000 house-
holds. The input pack included 2kg of OPV maize seed, 1kg of legume seed, 5kg of basal fertiliser and 5kg of top 
dressing fertiliser and illustrated instructions (Chinsinga et al. 2002).
The TIP was to a very great extent shaped by incidents of hunger crises and electoral politics. Following the 2001/2 
hunger crisis, the number of TIP beneficiaries was revised upward to 2.8 million as a means of facilitating recovery from 
a chronic hunger situation. In the 2004/5 growing season, the expectation was that the government would implement 
a universal fertiliser subsidy programme as implied during the electoral campaign but was hesitant to proceed due to 
apparent donor resistance (Chinsinga 2007). Instead, and rather belatedly, the government implemented what was 
described as ‘Extended Targeted Input Programme’ (ETIP). ETIP provided about 2 million households with 5kg of OPV 
maize seed, 12.5kg of both basal and top-dressing fertiliser and 1kg of legume seed.
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) (2005-to date)
AISP was introduced during the 2005/6 growing season following a devastating hunger crisis during the 2004/5 season. 
Using a voucher system, 1.5 million maize and 200,000 tobacco farmers were targeted. Maize farmers were entitled to 
one 50kg bag of basal and top dressing fertilisers. Both fertilisers were sold at MK950. Tobacco farmers were entitled to 
one 50kg bag of CAN and D compound each at MK1,450 per bag. Maize farmers had access to 3kg OPV maize at 
MK150/3kg compared to the market price of MK500/3kg. AISP has evolved since its introduction during the 2005/06 
growing season. The AISP has been subjected to modifications on a yearly basis building cumulatively on lessons learnt 
(see Table 2). In the maiden implementation of the AISP, the government received no support from its development 
partners because they felt the programme would jeopardise prospects for macroeconomic recovery and ‘all distribution 
of subsidised inputs was done by [two] parastatal bodies, Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) and Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFRM)’ (Dorward and Chirwa 2009: 3).
Box 1. Input Support Programmes in Malawi
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2. Historical and 
Contemporary Context of 
Cereal Seed Systems
2.1. Maize Dominance
In southern Africa, cereals are quite dominant in the crop 
portfolio. It is estimated that maize, millet and sorghum 
represent up to 77 percent of the total cereals and serve 
as staple food for the majority of the people in the region 
(Zerbe 2001). According to Williamson (1956), millet and 
sorghum were the main staples in Malawi until the turn 
of the twentieth century. These cereals were dramatically 
replaced by maize to the extent that by the close of the 
twentieth century Malawi’s per capita consumption of 
maize was, and is, the highest in the world (CIMMYT 1990; 
Hassan et al. 1996). This is further underscored by 
Denning et al. (2009) who observe that maize is grown 
by 97 percent of farming households and accounts for 
60 percent of the total calorie consumption. Recent data 
from MoAFS is quite illustrative of the dominance of 
maize in the crop portfolio of smallholder farmers in 
Malawi. As shown in Table 1, the growing area of rice, 
sorghum, millet, cassava, sweet potatoes and Irish pota-
toes combined does not even reach one third of that of 
maize. It is, in fact, estimated that at least 80 percent of 
the nation’s cultivable land is planted to maize each crop-
ping season (Smale and Jayne 2003).
The apparent increase in the hectares devoted to 
maize since 2005 is attributed mainly to the introduction 
of the AISP fertiliser subsidy programme through which 
farmers access a maximum of two 50kg bags of fertiliser 
at less than a quarter of the market price (see Box 1). The 
introduction of the fertiliser subsidy programme has not 
only led to the expansion of the hectares devoted to 
maize but also to a significant increase in the maize yields 
at both household and national levels. As already 
observed above, Malawi has been able to satisfy its 
national food requirements estimated 2.1 million metric 
tonnes. In 2005/6, total maize production stood at 2, 611, 
486, half a million metric tonnes over the annual national 
food requirement. The production shot to a record 3, 
444, 655 metric tonnes in the 2006/7 growing season 
and slumped to about 2,948,509 metric tonne during 
the 2007/8 growing season but well above the national 
annual food requirements (MVP 2008; UNESCO 2009). 
Prior to the introduction of the fertiliser subsidy 
programme, it is estimated farmers managed only 0.5 
metric tonnes per hectare but this jumped to 1.6 metric 
tonnes per hectare. According to Chirwa and Dorward 
(2010), the fertiliser subsidy programme is associated 
with an estimated yield response of 15.5kg grain per kg 
N for maize, 18.6 and 14.2 for hybrid and local maize 
varieties respectively. There is an additional per hectare 
increase in yield of 300 kg/hectare for hybrid compared 
with local maize varieties. The productivity increase of 
maize is therefore not only a result of incremental produc-
tion triggered by fertiliser use but also the expansion in 
hectares devoted to maize production.
2.2. Breeding Programmes and the Seed 
Industry
The key question is how has the dominance of maize in 
the cereal seed system and diet of the majority of 
Malawians shaped, influenced and had an impact on the 
breeding programmes in particular and the seed industry 
in general? The dominance of maize as a staple food 
potentially favoured technological breakthroughs in the 
maize seed industry since innovations tend to occur 
when either the producers of a commodity are few, 
homogeneous and economically powerful or when a 
commodity is of national significance as a wage good 
or source of foreign exchange (Pineiro and Trigo 1983). 
The paradox, however, is that nationally led advances 
in maize seed technology and other cereals have not 
been satisfactory, inter alia, underlined by relatively low 
rates of adoption of improved varieties by smallholder 
farmers within the southern African region. It is, for 
instance, estimated that smallholder farmer hybrid adop-
tion is at 43 percent compared to 65-100 percent in 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Smale and Jayne 
2003). Hybrid adoption rates were as low as 7 percent 
for most part of the 1980s before rising to 24 percent 
triggered by what Smale (1995) characterised as ‘Malawi’s 
delayed green revolution’ during the 1988-92 period.
A national breeding programme exits covering a wide 
range of crops such as maize, groundnuts, millet, cassava, 
sorghum, beans, peas, sugarcane etc. However, the 
breeding programme has been greatly influenced by 
institutional developments just before independence in 
July 1964, the liberalisation of the seed industry begin-
ning towards the end of the 1980s and the proliferation 
of input support programmes since the turn of the 1990s. 
The national breeding programme ‘enjoyed a remarkable 
but very brief period of success in the 1980s and early 
Table 1. Planting Area of Staple Crops (2000 - 2007) (ha)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Maize 1,507,008 1,506,528 1,488,449 1,568,975 1,537,651 1,513,929 1,600,506 1,686,442
Rice 43,542 50,146 56,029 54,407 42,568 49,154 53,631 57,371
Sorghum 55, 030 54,098 54,098 59,627 59,627 68,931 68,931 74,131
Millet 34,257 34,169 34,169 38,758 38,758 41,192 40,081 44,878
Cassava 183,486 202,338 112,071 156,645 156,645 153,687 151,623 174,932
Sweet Potato 147,118 192,457 115,679 169,478 149,478 128,982 118,577 150,592
Irish Potato 14,312 22,794 30,398 33,058 33,058 35,439 39,109 40,202
Source: JAICAF (2008: 41)
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1990s following a prolonged period of uncertainty in 
the post independence era which was curtailed by 
concerted donor drive toward liberalisation of the seed 
industry under the auspices of SAPs’2.
2.2.1. Colonial and Postcolonial Influences on the 
National Breeding Programme
The rather low uptake of hybrid maize among small-
holders in Malawi is a direct consequence of the enduring 
historical institutional constraints in the seed industry. 
Unlike Zimbabwe and Kenya, Malawi did not ‘develop a 
community of settler farmers who demanded high 
yielding maize varieties and had political clout to ensure 
that a public research system was established to develop 
them’ (Smale 1995: 819). In the post independence era, 
this was further constrained by the continuity of the dual 
agricultural development strategy that distinguished 
between estate and smallholder agriculture ‘with the 
latter officially considered as an engine of economic 
growth and widely seen as a training ground for future 
commercial farmers and a source of political patronage’3. 
The government developed a two pronged strategy of 
importing SR 52 seed from Zimbabwe for estates and 
breeding flinty composites for smallholders. 
This strategy was informed by field trials carried out 
by a British Breeder who concluded in 1971 that hybrid 
SR 52 and flint composite UCA were the most appropriate 
for Malawi’s agronomic conditions. The national breeding 
programme would therefore concentrate on develop-
ment and adaptation of semi-flint composites for 
consumption or sale by smallholders while SR 52 could 
be directly imported by estates from Zimbabwe (Smale 
and Jayne 2003). This eventually culminated in the 
discontinuance of the national hybrid maize breeding 
programme between 1967 and 1977. The recommenda-
tion for composites for smallholder farmers was based 
on the following: 1) that all hybrids have poor storage 
and hand-pounding characteristics; 2) all hybrids require 
high input levels; 3) smallholders will never use hybrids 
without seasonal credit; and 4) hybrid seed systems are 
necessarily more difficult to maintain than systems for 
delivering composites (Smale 1995).
Estates were not major producers of maize, however, 
they contributed between 8-10 percent of the total maize 
production while the rest was produced by almost over 
one million smallholder farmers. But as a major benefi-
ciary of the maize seed industry, their main preference-
‘grain texture’-was never the focus of the maize national 
breeding programme until the turn of the 1980s. 
Smallholder farmers have traditionally expressed prefer-
ence for flint maize varieties because they have a better 
proportion of hard starch to granules, a higher propor-
tion of flour to grain extraction rate and their harder 
grains protect them from weevils (Smale and Jayne 2003). 
The smallholder farmers were, however, not able to exert 
influence on the national maize breeding programme 
because they lacked ‘the formal organisation and 
supporting political institutions to enable them articulate 
their research needs’ (Smale 1995: 828). On the contrary 
estate owners had the political clout to push for technical 
advances in maize breeding but they were cultivating 
maize merely as a secondary crop (Zerbe 2001). They 
were primarily interested in technological breakthroughs 
in the tobacco breeding programme as their key crop. 
The national maize breeding programme’s primary focus 
on dents was not a cause of concern to estate owners 
because they were not interested in grain texture but 
rather in the maize yield criterion. This was rooted in the 
belief that dents have higher yield potential than flints, 
which was of particular interest to estate owners since 
‘they were using the maize to simply feed tenants on 
their farms’4. 
When the hybrid maize breeding programme was 
resurrected in 1977, donors notably the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), pushed 
for the consideration of ‘grain texture’ as one of the areas 
of focus in the breeding efforts. This was prompted by 
recurrent and worsening episodes of food insecurity, 
making it urgent to generate high yielding maize of suit-
able grain texture for smallholders. Working closely with 
researchers from CIMMYT, the national breeding 
programme succeeded to produce two semi-flint hybrids, 
namely: MH 17 and MH 18 in the late 1980s. These hybrids 
were appropriate for production by smallholder farmers 
who consume their own maize triggering ‘Malawi’s 
delayed green revolution’. The production of the semi-
flint hybrids held much promise because they appeared 
to be well adapted to both agro-climatic and smallholder 
objectives. Smale and Jayne (2003) summed up the 
promise of MH 17 and MH 18, characterised as ‘seeds of 
hope,’ as follows:
 • Farmer evaluations and experimental results demon-
strated that semi-flint maize hybrids could be processed 
on the farm as well as flint varieties.
 • Trial and demonstration results showed that there were 
only minor differences in yield among the various 
Malawi maize hybrids so that yield was not sacrificed 
for grain texture.
 • Analysis of trial results and extensive demonstration 
data for three of the major maize producing zones 
showed that unfertilised hybrid maize yields were 
higher than those of unfertilised local maize, even 
during the worst drought year in decades.
2.2.2. The Privatisation Drive of the Seed Industry
The hybrid maize revolution was short-lived, however. 
It was somewhat derailed by the onslaught of the liber-
alisation drive at the beginning of the 1990s. The hybrid 
maize revolution was made possible by complementary 
investments in agronomic research, seed distribution 
systems and rural infrastructure particularly the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) network. In 1978, a National Seed Company 
of Malawi (NSCM) was established with support from 
World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
to facilitate access to improved seed that could possibly 
trigger a green revolution (Cromwell 1991; Zerbe 2001). 
With support of donors throughout the 1980s ‘the high 
levels of coordination between the NSCM, ADMARC and 
MoA created an institutional framework that unleashed 
the hybrid maize revolution of the 1980s and 1990s’5; 
‘NSCM’s linkage with other relevant institutions in the 
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agricultural sector fanned the zeal of breeders to produce 
new materials’6; and ‘more importantly local scientists 
had an immediate outlet for their research products’7. 
The NSCM played a major role in establishing the basis 
for foundation seed production and maintenance, orga-
nizing and training seed growers, and inspecting seed 
together with government seed officers.
The NSCM was owned by Cargill, the United Kingdom 
Commonwealth Development Corporation and 
ADMARC. It was the monopoly producer of most seeds 
particularly hybrids (Cromwell 1991). In the wake of the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of 1980s, seed 
companies were targeted for privatisation, the argument 
being that they had failed to widen farmers’ access to 
improved seed largely because state run companies are 
inherently inefficient, mismanaged and unprofitable 
(Zerbe 2001; Howard et al. 2001). It was, for instance, 
estimated that less than one third of developing country 
farmers had never used seed provided by national seed 
companies despite ‘efforts to replace the informal sector 
with a public sector dominated system (Howard et al. 
2001: 10). In southern Africa, it is estimated that small-
scale farmers rely heavily on informal seed networks 
saving 60-70 percent of seed used on-farm, and acquiring 
30-40 percent from relatives, neighbours and other 
community sources. It was thus strongly felt that the 
exclusion of market forces and reliance on bureaucracies 
was not an efficient way to harmonize supply and 
demand of the seed systems (Nambiro et al. 2001). 
Consequently SAPs demanded complete liberalisation 
of seed multiplication and distribution, restriction of 
public agricultural research, and seed line development, 
and the limitations to the state’s regulatory capacity.
The privatisation of NSCM started with Cargill acquiring 
a controlling stake at 55 percent in 1990. Cargill sold 
some of its shares to Monsanto in 1998, but Monsanto’s 
target was to own 100 percent of the shares which it 
managed to do in 2003. According to Smale (1995), when 
Cargill bought a controlling stake, it started rationalizing 
the operations of NSCM and embarked on a more aggres-
sive marketing strategy for Malawi maize hybrids which 
partly contributed to the ‘Malawi’s hybrid revolution’ in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Monsanto further stream-
lined the product lines ‘focusing almost entirely on maize, 
and hybrid maize for that matter’8. Thus unlike the NSCM 
that had various lines of seed production, Monsanto 
concentrates almost exclusively on hybrid maize and to 
a lesser extent vegetable seeds. 
2.3. Privatisation and the Seed Industry
2.3.1. The Contemporary Landscape of the Seed 
Industry
The seed industry in Malawi is now fully liberalised. There 
are both international and local players in the seed 
industry. However, the seed industry is dominated by 
the multinational seed companies which control about 
90 percent of the market (GRAIN 2010). The multinational 
seed companies included Monsanto, Seed Co., Pannar 
Seed and Pioneer. Some of the local seed companies 
include Agritec, Demeta, Funuwe Farms and the 
Association of Smallholder Seed Multiplication Group 
(ASSMAG). Monsanto is the most dominant multinational 
seed company controlling more than 50 percent of the 
market share of improved maize varieties. However, the 
business portfolios of the seed companies are less diversi-
fied. Almost all of them focus almost exclusively on the 
production of hybrid maize seeds. Some companies, 
notably Pannar, also deal in Open Pollinated Varieties 
(OPVs). Almost all the companies are also engaged in 
the production of vegetable seeds principally for winter 
cultivation.
The total seed market is estimated at about 30,000 
metric tonnes annually of which improved seed is 32 
percent or 9000 metric tonnes for which effective 
demand is estimated at 4,500 metric tonnes. Smallholder 
farmers’ adoption of improved maize has been rather 
sluggish. According to the 2009/10 estimates, around 
30% of the farmers are still cultivating local maize seed 
varieties (GRAIN 2010). As a result, the sale of improved 
seed is greatly influenced by government policies at any 
particular point in time. Pure market purchases of 
improved have essentially remained stagnant but sales 
peak up when government implements some form of 
input support programmes. For instance, sales of 
improved seed are at their peak following government’s 
implementation of the fertiliser subsidy programme. 
Similar trends were observed when the government 
implemented the SP and TIP in the late 1990s and early 
2000s respectively. 
The major local player in the seed industry is ASSMAG. 
It started off as a MoA initiative in 1995 whose goal was 
‘to ensure the availability of adaptable, affordable, 
improved seed for the smallholder farmers who could 
not afford hybrid seeds’9. It was transformed into an 
association in 1999 with funding from the European 
Union (EU). It deals with various crops such as open polli-
nated varieties (OPV) maize, groundnuts, beans, cassava, 
sweet potatoes, sorghum, soya beans, rice, millet etc. 
The main seed product for ASSMAG is OPV maize since 
‘funding for the multiplication of other crops is often not 
readily available’10. ASSMAG works closely with the 
national breeding programme which is the sole source 
of the foundation seeds used in its multiplication 
programmes.
The players in the seed industry have constituted 
themselves into the Seed Traders Association of Malawi 
(STAM) which is ‘essentially a self regulatory body for the 
seed industry to ensure that farmers are served with 
quality seed throughout the country’11. The formation 
of STAM followed ‘excessive decline in seed quality and 
standards due to unscrupulous traders who were simply 
offering ‘decorated grain’ on the market as seed’12. The 
seed industry interacts with government on matters of 
seed in relation to the input support programmes 
through STAM. It is only STAM accredited seed suppliers 
that are involved in the input support programmes in 
order to ensure that farmers are supplied with certified 
and quality seed.
As part of the liberalisation framework, seed compa-
nies distribute their products through the agro-dealer 
network. The development of the agro-dealer network 
is to a large extent being facilitated by a USAID sponsored 
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Citizen Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA) NGO as an 
integral part of the efforts to kick-start a robust retail 
network for agricultural inputs throughout the country 
to fill the  vacuum created by closure of some ADMARC 
markets (Adesina 2009). The main objective of CFNA is 
to increase rural incomes by assisting farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs by: 1) strengthening market linkages; 2) 
building input supply networks; 3) promoting enterprise 
growth and development; 4) enabling agribusiness 
financing; and 5) improving processing and marketing. 
CNFA’s vision is that these activities would transform the 
fragmented input distribution system into an efficient, 
commercially viable input supply infrastructure which 
would in turn afford smallholder farmers greater access 
to productivity enhancing inputs and technologies 
(Odame 2010). CFNA promotes a market oriented system 
of input supply to farmers. It thus advocates for the 
replacement of state run structures’ direct role in inputs 
purchase and distribution by fostering the growth of a 
commercially based rural distribution network of private 
agro-dealers, facilitate agro-dealers’ access to commercial 
credit, and stimulate smallholders’ demand for improved 
agricultural inputs.
The promotion of the private sector is seen as a viable 
alternative to the progressive development of a robust 
agricultural sector. The state run input supply system is 
condemned as inefficient and highly susceptible to 
massive rent seeking pursuits which is not in the interest 
of the smallholder farmers. Through the use of vouchers, 
a viable agro-dealer network, is described as ‘a way of 
improving agricultural input and output markets while 
providing support to resource poor farmers’ (Mangisoni 
2007: 1). CFNA performs a brokerage role between agro-
dealers and seed companies even though individual 
agro-dealers can interact with seed companies on their 
own. In order to qualify as an agro-dealer, ‘one must not 
only have a financial muscle but must also be well enlight-
ened’13. CNFA advertises for applications from suitable 
individuals or companies, indicating that potential appli-
cants must own a building, have access to potable water, 
functioning toilet, protective clothing, and the premises 
must be far away from fast food outlets or paraffin selling 
points.
While seed companies have the liberty to breed their 
products elsewhere, the multiplication of the seed for 
sale must be done in the country. Seed companies 
contract out the seed multiplication exercise to eligible 
farmers across the country. Interested farmers apply to 
seed companies for seed multiplication contracts but 
‘the isolation requirement rules out small farmers14. The 
isolation requirement for a field designated for seed 
multiplication is 400m and 200m radius for hybrids and 
OPVs respectively. It was, in fact, argued that ‘seed multi-
plication is not a business for poor people; it is for elites 
since it requires the farmer to have adequate money 
which, realistically speaking, can only be managed by 
farmers with land in excess of 10 hectares’15. 
Seed companies register their farmers with MoAFS’s 
Seed Services Unit which inspects the maize fields during 
the growing season to ensure that standards for certifica-
tion are met. The companies provide seed to the farmers 
and bear the costs of inspection as well. In addition to 
land, the farmer meets the costs of labour and fertiliser. 
The seed is sent to the companies’ laboratories immedi-
ately after harvesting for authentication and checking 
of moisture content. Seed companies pay seed farmers 
in dollars on the basis of moisture content, the recom-
mended moisture content being 12 percent. Any excess 
moisture content beyond 12 percent attracts deduction 
from the farmers’ payment.
The seed industry in Malawi is clearly dominated by 
the multinational companies with the locally based 
companies playing a very minor role. The multinational 
companies have inserted themselves as a dominant actor 
in the seed industry following the liberalisation of the 
industry at the insistence of donors. Some of the liber-
alisation policies include the Competition and Fair 
Trading Act of 1998, Biosafety Act of 2002, Biosafety 
Regulations and Biosafety Policy of 2007. Major donor 
agencies such as USAID are enthusiastic about promoting 
the development of the private sector through such 
outfits as CNFA. The agro-dealer network is strategically 
linked to the multinational seed companies as major 
outlets of seed supply to the farmers across the country. 
Both government and donors turn to the multinational 
seed companies whenever they run programmes meant 
to assist impoverished farmers with seeds. These devel-
opments have invariably led to the seed industry being 
captured by a narrow group of the private sector players 
propped up by both government and donors. These 
private sector actors are offering a narrow range of tech-
nologies to famers since the liberalisation of the seed 
industry has resulted in more or less total neglect of the 
public sector breeding efforts. A tight network between 
donors, government and seed companies has developed 
privileging multinational seed companies in the process. 
This is essentially a culmination of the interaction 
between the environment created by the neoliberal poli-
cies implemented in Malawi and the nature of seed 
companies that have been established under those 
conditions.
2.3.2. Privatisation and the National Breeding 
Programme
The privatisation of the seed industry has substantially 
marginalized the national breeding programme. It was, 
for instance, observed that ‘the national breeding 
programme exits but it is not as robust as it was during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s’16. The disappearance of 
the NSCM has ‘turned Malawi into a sales point for seed 
materials bred outside the country’17; ‘there is little, if not 
lack of uptake of materials from the national breeding 
programme since the national breeding programme is 
under-funded to produce materials that can compete 
with those from multinationals’18. The major argument 
by seed companies is that they ‘are interested in quality 
as an integral part of their competition strategy which 
forces them to look beyond the borders’19. In order to 
therefore retain a competitive edge, seed companies 
‘promote their own materials because the quality from 
the national breeding programme would be essentially 
the same’20; and ‘are further let down by the absence of 
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the breeders’ rights legislative framework in Malawi’21. 
In short, the disappearance of the NSCM implies that the 
national breeding programme does not have a reliable 
conduit for its materials since ‘at the peak of the NSCM 
all varieties bred by the national breeding programme 
were bought, multiplied and sold to ADMARC for distri-
bution to farmers’22.
While the multinational companies are not obligated 
to utilise materials from the national breeding 
programme, the stature of the programme has been 
further undermined by gross under-funding. It was 
consistently observed that ‘breeders are funded on salary 
and not operational costs’23 resulting in frustration ‘that 
has seen a critical cadre of breeders that was assembled 
during the hybrid maize revolution leaving for greener 
pastures’24. This critical mass of breeders has never been 
fully replaced. It was, for instance, observed that the 
breeding section in MoAFS is facing serious staff 
constraints as ‘about 12 positions of senior scientists have 
not been filled in the last four years’25. Moreover, most 
junior scientists are using MoAFS as a stepping stone for 
rewarding careers elsewhere such that ‘the remaining 
senior scientists do not have understudies so as to ensure 
institutional continuity’26. Strikingly ‘there is no sense of 
urgency to address the serious human resource 
constraints in the breeding section of the MoAFS’27.
Most of the existing breeding programmes are thus 
running on project funds and not on government’s devel-
opment budget28. The funding constraints have therefore 
effectively undermined the continuity of the successful 
research on hybrids that spurred the green revolution 
of the 1980s and 1990s. The funding is so low to the 
extent that ‘it is often difficult to constantly inject founda-
tion seed for multiplication to meet the demand of 
farmers’29. These hybrids created a revolution ‘because 
they satisfied the local agronomic conditions, processing 
methods and storability’30. Some companies like Pannar 
interact with the national breeding programme but most 
of its clients are local seed companies. The local seed 
companies are mainly interested in OPVs ‘because they 
know they cannot effectively compete with the multi-
nationals on hybrids’31. The multinational and local seed 
companies have different interests, inter alia, reflected 
in their pattern of interaction with the national breeding 
programme. The major competition strategy for local 
seed companies is offering farmers products that appeal 
to their preferences such as taste, storability and pound-
ability. The national breeding programme has at least 
capacity to produce OPV maize varieties. Multinational 
seed companies are interested in offering high yielding 
hybrid maize varieties that the national breeding 
programme cannot provide. They are interested in 
hybrids because they cannot be recycled as a strategy 
for guaranteeing the profitability of their business. The 
capacity of the national breeding programme to achieve 
this feat is almost non-existent hence limited interaction 
between the multinational seed companies and the 
national breeding programme.
Some breeders are nonetheless optimistic about the 
national breeding programme the challenges created 
by liberalisation notwithstanding. They argue that ‘the 
opening up of the seed industry has raised the breeding 
bar because for the materials of local breeders to be 
embraced by multinational companies, they must be 
really good’32. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that the 
dominance of multinationals in the seed industry is 
denying farmers the opportunity to use seeds that are 
well adapted to the local agronomic conditions since 
‘materials bred elsewhere can only be second best’33. 
Moreover, the technological breakthroughs in breeding 
in temperate areas are not easily transferred to many of 
the smallholder farmers who produce in wide range of 
micro-climates found in the developing world (Morris 
2001). 
SAPs might have had significant impact on the national 
breeding programme but ‘government’s priorities in the 
agricultural sector too are to blame’34. This was particu-
larly emphasized with regard to the budgetary domi-
nance of input support programmes in MoAFS’s activity 
portfolio, ‘falling short of renaming MoAFS as Ministry 
of Input Support Programmes’35. The argument is that 
MoAFS is spending almost all its time on AISP at the 
expense of the normal agricultural development 
programmes particularly research and extension. There 
is also very limited interaction between the multinational 
companies on one hand and the national breeding 
programmes and universities on the other, except 
through seed testing. The requirement is that new vari-
eties have to be tested for their suitability to local agro-
nomic conditions at least two years before their formal 
release onto the market.
The seed products of multinational companies are 
readily embraced even though they may not necessarily 
be ideal for the local agronomic conditions mainly 
because of the crumbling of the national breeding 
programme. The viability of the programme was hugely 
dependent on donor funding. The multinational seed 
companies have fully taken advantage of the liberalisa-
tion drive to assert themselves as a dominant supplier 
of seeds in the country controlling about 90 percent of 
the market share (GRAIN 2010). The policy framework 
does not oblige them to breed seeds in the country 
except for purposes of testing prior to the release of new 
varieties. Consequently, there is very little that can be 
done even if the varieties are not quite suitable to the 
local agronomic conditions because the country is almost 
entirely dependent on the multinational companies for 
improved seed supply. Moreover, the multinational 
companies’ seed products are in tune with the interests 
of both donors and government officials. They are both 
interested in high yielding maize varieties as a quick fix 
to the enduring problem of hunger in Malawi. It therefore 
does not really matter as long as the seed products are 
proven to be high yielding although they may not neces-
sarily be fully amenable to the local agronomic 
conditions.
In addition, the multinational companies do not make 
much effort to bring onto the local market the best prod-
ucts because of the apparent limited market as observed 
above. As a result, seed companies neither develop seeds 
locally nor import their best materials. This leaves farmers 
with seeds that do not contain the latest improvements 
to deal with drought, pests or nutritional quality of the 
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grain. The crumbling of the public sector breeding 
programmes has meant that the country has almost 
entirely dependent on the multinational seed companies 
for the bulk of improved seed supply although not neces-
sarily of the ideal quality for the local agronomic condi-
tions. This has been reinforced by the shrewd business 
strategies of multinational companies that have, inter 
alia, succeeded to marginalise the national breeding 
programme further buffeted by the coincidence of inter-
ests of donors and government in finding quick fixes to 
the enduring problem of food insecurity even though 
for different reasons.
2.3.3. Privatisation and the Fate of Alternative 
Cereal Seed Systems
The privatisation of the seed industry has further margin-
alised the other cereal seed systems particularly sorghum 
and millet. While the national breeding programme had 
active breeding lines for sorghum and millet, whose 
outputs were readily taken up by the NSCM, the multi-
national companies do not consider these as priorities. 
They argue that ‘there is no effective demand for sorghum 
and millet to warrant investment since we are interested 
in crops that will bring us profits on a sustainable basis’36. 
Seed companies are thus interested in those seeds for 
which there is effective demand, a predictable market 
in terms of volume and frequency, and which are profit-
able requiring regular purchase of seed (Tripp 2001; 
Howard et al. 2001; Zerbe 2001). For this reason, it is only 
new varieties of maize that enter farming systems with 
regularity except when there are special development 
programmes for what are variously described as ‘orphan 
crops’, ‘forgotten crops’, ‘non-commercial crops’ or 
‘women’s crops’ (CIAT et al. 2009). Almost 90 percent of 
the seed for sorghum and millet are sourced informally 
through well established farmer diffusion systems.
Sorghum and millet were constantly described as 
‘almost obsolete crops since everyone is growing maize’37; 
and ‘about to disappear just like pure local maize vari-
eties’38. It is difficult to find pure local maize varieties 
‘because they have been adulterated through cross polli-
nation even though farmers still describe these varieties 
as local’39. According to both communities and officials, 
sorghum and millet are being displaced by maize for 
three main reasons: 1) they require more land than maize 
making them less attractive especially in the wake of 
increasing land shortages; 2) they are less yielding than 
maize; and 3) returns to labour are higher to maize than 
sorghum and millet since they require labour time for 
scaring birds (cf. Smale and Jayne 2003). The main chal-
lenge for these seeds is that ‘there is lack of adequate 
breeders’ seed since most breeding initiatives are project 
based; there is thus lack of relevant breeding programmes 
with adequate long-term support’40. 
There has never been a national breeding programme 
focusing on local maize varieties, even in the develop-
ment hybrid maize varieties. This is to say that indigenous 
maize varieties are not used as mother plants even 
though they are known to have strong resistance to 
diseases and pests (JAICAF 2008). This is, of course, justi-
fied on a scientific basis. According to Smale (1995), 
inbred lines developed from local flint materials are too 
tall and their growing season too long. Overall, however, 
the fate of sorghum and millet seed systems reflects 
‘failure to set adequate research priorities, and to work 
with research partners particularly universities to set 
research priorities to ensure sustainable seed systems 
at the national level’41. This was emphasized by donors 
who argued that it is difficult to appreciate the fate of 
sorghum and millet seed systems; they should have been 
priorities for the government since the maize seed 
industry is well served by both local and multinational 
companies. The millet and sorghum seed systems are 
reportedly thriving in some areas, mostly in Ngoni domi-
nated areas, because of robust cultural systems. Ngoni’s 
place ‘cultural premium on three things: meat, women 
and beer but not just any other beer but beer made from 
either from sorghum or millet, if not local maize’42. The 
efforts at the local level to preserve these seed systems 
are therefore tied to the question of cultural identity. 
Sorghum and millet seed systems are further in decline 
as a direct consequence of the rampant decline of the 
livestock industry in the country. In areas where there 
are no cultural drives to preserve these seed systems, 
farmers lack ready markets to dispose of these cereals. 
A robust livestock industry would have greatly helped 
‘to create demand for millet and sorghum which could 
have even attracted the attention of the multinational 
seed companies to invest in these dying seed systems’43. 
Moreover, sorghum and millet have significant commer-
cial and nutritional potential. Recent research has 
revealed their suitability for making of pasta, breakfast 
cereals, porridge, salty snacks and for paper, cardboard 
and cupboard (Zerbe 2001). In Malawi, they function as 
alternative staple crops when the maize crop fails due 
to insufficient rainfall. Furthermore, sorghum could help 
to address nyctatopia caused by vitamin A deficiency 
and anaemia due to iron deficiency. These deficiencies 
are rampant in Malawi as a result of the diet biased in 
favour of white maize (JAICAF 2008).
The fate of alternative cereal seed systems reveals 
competing narratives about what is the exact nature of 
the problem with the Malawian seed system. For seed 
companies, the fate of alternative crops such as sorghum 
and millet is merely a logical response to the forces of 
demand and supply. There is no effective demand for 
alternative cereals hence it makes no economic sense 
to invest in them. The main drive for seed companies is 
to invest in seeds whose returns are the greatest for 
purposes of maximising profit. For donors, the respon-
sibility of ensuring that alternative cereal seed systems 
are vibrant is entirely the governments. Since the produc-
tion of improved maize has been taken up by the multi-
national seed companies, this gives the government the 
opportunity to concentrate its efforts on alternative seed 
systems through the national breeding programme. 
Communities are not very much in favour of the alterna-
tive cereals because of labour intensity, land scarcity, low 
productivity and lack of markets. The coalition of seed 
companies and donors has dominated decisions that 
have shaped the fate of alternative seed systems. 
Liberalisation policies promoted by donors have privi-
leged seed companies which have exploited the 
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attendant policy environment to their advantage. The 
seed companies have become dominant sources of seeds 
since liberalisation has meant donors’ withdrawal of 
support to the national breeding programme. This has 
further been reinforced by the fact that donors often 
turn to multinational companies whenever they want 
to extend assistance to farmers though various 
programmes.
The main winners are the multinational seed compa-
nies since they have succeeded in exploiting the weak 
policy environment following the implementation of 
liberalisation policy reforms promoted by donors. The 
multinational seed companies control about 90 percent 
of the market shares. The fact that donors target the 
multinational seed companies as  the main seed suppliers 
to programmes aimed at assisting impoverished farmers 
with access to improved seed has not only marginalised 
the national breeding programme but also the local seed 
companies. Their major source of materials is the national 
breeding programme and as long as it is not active, the 
local companies cannot compete effectively with the 
multinational seed companies. Moreover, local seed 
companies are hardly enlisted as seed suppliers to seed 
assistance programmes implemented exclusively by 
donors. The government has also propped up multina-
tional seed companies through its subsidy programmes. 
The seed component of the subsidy programme is almost 
always supported by donors who regard seed offered 
by the multinational companies as being intrinsically 
superior to those offered by their local counterparts.
Farmers are the main losers. Even though they are not 
in favour of alternative cereal seed systems, the margin-
alisation of the public breeding programme and its 
limited interaction with the multinational seed compa-
nies has meant there is hardly a reliable vehicle through 
which farmers can be exposed to the various products 
of the national breeding programme. Local seed compa-
nies rely entirely on the national breeding programme 
for their products but they only control 10 percent of 
the seed market. For instance, the national breeding 
programme has been producing varieties of beans, 
cowpeas and soya beans but these remain highly inac-
cessible to farmers since multinational seed companies 
which control about 90 percent of the market do not 
deal with the national breeding programme. Yet crop 
diversification to the Malawian farmer in coping with 
production risks is extremely important. The farmers do 
not even have a wide range of choice in the hybrid maize 
market due to the fact that Malawi is not a priority market 
for the seed companies as a result of limited effective 
demand unless buoyed by special input support 
programmes. 
The seed industry in Malawi has been greatly shaped 
by donors’ competing perceptions of how to develop a 
viable seed system powered by the private sector under 
aegis of economic liberalisation. The seed companies 
have exploited the attendant policy environment to their 
advantage propped up by donors and government in a 
way that has marginalised the national breeding 
programme and local seed companies. This has, in turn, 
reduced the range of crop portfolio readily available to 
farmers yet crop diversification is extremely important 
for the Malawian farmer following the increasingly fragile 
climatic patterns which makes attainment of food secu-
rity highly unpredictable.
2.4. Issues and Challenges in the Seed 
Industry
The seed industry has been substantially reconfigured 
by the implementation of liberalisation policy reforms. 
These reforms have created different forms of actor 
networks and coalitions, both stable and fluid, with 
competing interests couched in narratives and counter 
narratives about what the major problems in the seed 
industry are and how they can be successfully be dealt 
with. The engagement and contestation between various 
actor networks and coalitions structured around various 
input support programmes has had substantial impact 
on the nature and form of the seed industry with signifi-
cant practical implications going forward. 
There is an alliance of donors and seed companies 
that has been harnessed by donors’ push for liberalisation 
of the seed industry. An ensemble of liberalisation poli-
cies has created a rather weak policy environment that 
multinational seed companies as well as political elites 
have exploited to their advantage. For most donors, a 
private sector led seed system, supported by a permissive 
policy environment, is a surest strategy to kick-starting 
a sustainable version of African green revolution. 
Consequently, major donors are promoting the establish-
ment of an extensive agro-dealer network as a viable 
alternative to the state run system of input supply to 
farmers which is condemned as inefficient and highly 
susceptible to rent seeking activities. In this alliance, seed 
companies are propped up donors and government 
through various input support programmes. As pointed 
out above, donors often support the seed component 
of the input support programmes in which multinational 
seed companies are targeted as the primary suppliers 
since their seed products are deemed intrinsically supe-
rior to those offered by the local seed companies but 
perhaps more critically important high yielding hence 
a panacea to the intractable problem of food insecurity. 
Both donors and government are keen to find quick fixes 
to the problem of hunger, but in addition the input 
support programmes, as demonstrated below, creates 
opportunities for patronage for government officials and 
their supporters This has, in turn, marginalised the poten-
tial development of the local seed industry.
The national breeding programme is marginalised 
since the multinational seed companies do not deal with 
it except when it comes to testing new seed varieties 
prior to their release which is a statutory requirement. 
Local seed companies are the major client of the national 
breeding programme as it is the sole source of their 
genetic materials. The national breeding programme is 
not as robust as it used to be prior to liberalisation since 
donors no longer massively fund the national breeding 
programme. There is no need to channel funds to the 
national breeding programme since, in a liberalised envi-
ronment; the private sector will take care of the seed 
requirements on the basis of the forces of demand and 
Working Paper 013 www.future-agricultures.org11
supply. Yet, as demonstrated above, the private sector, 
dominated by the multinational companies, have their 
own interests that have invariably led to the dramatic 
decline of the national breeding programme.
Farmers are the greatest losers. The multinational seed 
companies control 90 percent of the market share yet 
they do not deal with the national breeding programme. 
This means that Malawi has become dependent on the 
multinational companies for seed supply even though 
the seeds are often less ideal for the local agronomic 
conditions. The range of genetic materials, even within 
the hybrid maize genre, is limited due to the business 
strategies of the multinational companies. This has led 
to more or less the disappearance of the alternative cereal 
seed systems notably millet and sorghum. Furthermore, 
the dominance of the multinational companies in the 
seed industry has meant products such as beans, 
cowpeas and soya beans from the national breeding 
programme do not have a vehicle through they can get 
to farmers since the local seed companies only serve 10 
percent of the market. There is some competition 
between local and multinational seed companies 
bordering on what they offer to the Malawian farmer. 
Local seed companies deal mostly in OPV maize whereas 
multinational seed companies promote hybrid maize 
varieties. The manner in which this competition plays 
out in practice undercuts the progressive development 
of the local seed industry putting the farmer at a further 
disadvantage.
What issues and challenges have these developments 
created for the seed industry in Malawi in the post liber-
alisation context? The rest of this section examines the 
political economy dynamics of the set of issues and chal-
lenges facing the seed industry in the country. These 
issues and challenges raise several critical questions as 
follows:
 • What is the future of the local seed companies and the 
national breeding programme?
 • Who are the main winners and losers as a result of the 
reconfiguration of the seed industry?
 • To what extent does the government have capacity 
to effectively enforce the emerging policy and regula-
tory framework for the seed industry?
 • What are the key debates about the policy and regula-
tory framework for the seed industry?
Section three therefore contextualises how these 
issues and challenges have actually played out in the 
implementation of the various input support programmes 
since towards the end of 1990s paying particular atten-
tion to the political economy implications.
2.4.1. Local Seed Industry and National Breeding 
Programme
Liberalisation has intensified competition between local 
and multinational seed companies which in turn has 
undermined the progressive development of the local 
seed industry and the stature of the national breeding 
programme. The multinational companies are deter-
mined to retain their dominance in the seed industry. 
The local seed companies do not own their own seed 
processing equipment hence they have to hire the 
equipment from the multinational counterparts ‘yet we 
are competitors even though we primarily target the 
poorest farmers as we produce only OPVs’44. Consequently, 
local seed companies often loses out business because 
seed companies prioritise processing their own seeds 
‘even when requests for seed processing are made in 
good time in view of tight contract deadlines’45. In the 
2009/10, for instance, ASSMAG has not been able to 
supply seeds to the subsidy programme ‘because the 
seed companies were busy throughout the year’46. The 
export demand for seed was quite high by countries like 
Kenya and Zimbabwe due to serious droughts experi-
enced during the last growing season. This happened 
‘despite repeated reassurances that they [seed compa-
nies] would process our seed to enable us fulfil our 
contractual obligations’47.
The regular slip ups by the local seed companies to meet 
their contractual obligations are affecting their ability to 
establish themselves as serious competitors in the seed 
industry. For instance, there is a huge market potential 
for ASSMAG ‘since we deal with OPVs which are being 
promoted by NGOs but with regular slip ups in seed 
processing we are letting down our clients’48. There is 
thus a strong sense that the regular slip ups in processing 
local companies’ seed are a deliberately orchestrated 
competitive tactic on the part of seed companies. Some 
of the seed companies are producing OPVs but for those 
producing exclusively hybrid, it was argued, ‘their market 
share could shrink if farmers embrace the use of OPVs 
which are recyclable on a wider scale’49. This is the case 
because ‘seed companies engage in [China-type] busi-
ness, offering non-durable products because they want 
money while we [ASSMAG], know the depth and breadth 
of poverty in Malawi hence we promote OPVs that can 
be recycled’50.
The stature of the national breeding programme is nega-
tively affected because the multinational seed compa-
nies, which control about 90 percent of the market, do 
not engage with them except when they want release 
their new materials. The official position is that the multi-
national seed companies do not engage with the national 
breeding programme because the country has yet to 
legislate for breeders’ rights. Seed companies consider 
the non-existence of breeders’ rights legislation as a 
major hindrance to working with the national breeding 
programme since its materials are highly susceptible to 
theft. They argue that ‘it is impossible to guarantee profit-
ability in a situation where breeders’ rights are virtually 
non-existent; the situation is propitious to the prolifera-
tion of counterfeit products’51. It is for this reason that 
‘we are reluctant to bring in new varieties onto the 
Malawian market’52. For many public sector officials, this 
is just an excuse to marginalise the national breeding 
programme and promote their own materials as a way 
of undercutting potential competition from local seed 
companies. A vibrant national breeding programme, 
which is the sole source of genetic materials for local 
seed companies would enhance competition between 
local and multinational companies if the materials would 
be both of high quality and suitable to the local agro-
nomic conditions.
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2.4.2. Winners and Losers in the Seed Industry
The liberalisation of the seed industry has given rise to 
a new middle layer of elites that are at least sharing the 
attendant benefits at the expense of the poor farmer for 
whom the reforms were intended to serve. The paradox, 
however, is that even this emerging group of elites feel 
that seed companies are the major beneficiary of the 
liberalisation of the seed industry. The middle level elites 
are the agro-dealers and contract seed growers for the 
multinational seed companies. No ordinary person can 
qualify either as an agro-dealer or contract seed grower 
since both ventures require massive capital outlays. Both 
ventures are thus elitist, extending benefits of liberalisa-
tion of the seed industry to a privileged few. Most of 
these emerging elites are politically connected, since as 
further demonstrated in section three, government offi-
cials have exploited the input support programmes as 
a source of political patronage.
However, seed companies are deemed exploitative by 
most agro-dealers because they prefer providing seed 
to agro-dealers on loan and are paid on a commission 
basis ‘which most of the times just goes to settle the 
loans on which seed companies charge interest’53. Many 
agro-dealers considered the practice of seed companies 
charging interest on loans extended to them as illegal. 
The main concern is that the seed companies are over-
stepping their mandate, ‘behaving as if they are lending 
institutions which warrant scrutiny of their licenses’54. 
While seed multiplication is generally acknowledged as 
a lucrative business, there were nonetheless sentiments 
that the exercise is exploitative. It was, for instance, 
argued that ‘[seed multiplication] just works out exactly 
in the same way as a tenancy system in tobacco farming 
which is very exploitative’. The main concern centres on 
the huge price differentials between what seed compa-
nies offer to the seed growers and what they get when 
they put the seed on the market. An example was given 
of a seed company which offers growers MK90 per kg 
but sales the seed at MK3750 per a 10 kg package.
Multinational seed companies are clear winners in a 
liberalised seed industry. The country is not only entirely 
dependent on them for the bulk of improved seed supply 
but also the seed companies are making the most out 
in their interaction with their supportive superstructures. 
The poor farmer is a complete loser. Neither can poor 
farmers capture the benefits of liberalisation as contract 
seed growers or agro-dealers nor are they beneficiaries 
of a readily accessible wide ranging supply of improved 
seeds. Private seed companies have been hesitant to 
provide multiple varieties of seed in small quantities 
desired by smallholders, as doing so increases inventory, 
storage and transportation costs and reduces economies 
of scale (Zerbe 2001). This is a direct consequence of the 
‘conflict between generating profits and serving small, 
poor farmers with special varieties and small quantities 
of seed that they require’55.
2.4.3. State Regulation of the Seed Industry
The liberalisation of the seed industry has substantially 
undermined the capacity of the state to effectively regu-
late the seed industry. The adoption and implementation 
of the liberalisation policies in a quick succession has 
contributed to the creation of considerable challenges 
in the implementation of the regulatory frameworks. 
Several actors have taken advantages of the weaknesses 
and lapses in the regulatory policy environment to 
advance their selfish interests as demonstrated below 
at the expense of the poor Malawian farmer. While the 
policy and regulatory framework for the seed industry 
is lauded as sound and progressive, ‘it is but undermined 
by laxity in enforcement’56. There is thus questionable 
capacity for MoAFS agencies to enforce standards in the 
seed industry in order to ensure the availability of quality 
seed to the farmer. 
The laxity in the enforcement of standards is partly trig-
gered by political opportunism and limited capacity of 
the responsible agencies. Booth et al. (2006) argue that 
the failure to manage the transition to democracy was, 
inter alia, manifested in declining capacity of the civil 
service to function professionally. This was attributed to 
the fact that patronage considerations were prepon-
derant in informing, conceptualizing and implementing 
policies. In the seed industry, the impact of this policy 
milieu was felt with regard to the Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP) (2001-4). It was argued that ‘politics 
totally undermined the seed inspection regime since 
there was virtually no political will to enforce the regula-
tory framework’57. Most of the politically connected seed 
suppliers to the programme ‘simply provided grain from 
the village which affected the quality and impact of the 
programme’58. 
This was not only restricted to the TIP. Most commercial 
seed suppliers ‘were simply putting on the market 
painted grains as seed’59. The capacity for seed inspection 
remains limited despite efforts to ratchet it up through 
localising training in seed technology. It is a huge chal-
lenge for the seed certifying agency to carry out the 
exercise for seed grown in dispersed locations due to 
‘paucity of staff even though such expertise is available 
locally’60. This is further undermined by rampant corrup-
tion in seed inspection exercises. The root cause of this 
problem is that seed inspectors are not adequately 
resourced in a decentralized set-up which ‘predisposes 
them to fraud, malpractices and corruption, resulting in 
excessive laxity in the enforcement of the regulations’61. 
In the seed inspection regime, corruption perpetrated 
mostly NGO officials, ‘has in some cases resulted in OPVs 
being over recycled, which greatly undermines the 
productivity of the seed’62. This is exacerbated by the 
rather limited capacity of the seed inspection agencies 
and further compounded by ‘the lack of constant injec-
tion of the breeders’ seed into the system’63. Furthermore, 
the weak seed inspection regime has made it possible 
for ‘seed companies to recycle their products, which is 
greatly affecting germination rates’64. In some cases, the 
germination rates are as low as 40 percent such that 
farmers are forced to replant altogether. Seed companies 
are supposed to bring onto the fresh seed products every 
year but have been able to recycle because ‘seed inspec-
tion is either non-existent or the sampling that is done 
to detect such malpractices is inadequate’.65
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2.4.4. Policy and Regulatory Framework
While Malawi has a fairly sound and progressive policy 
and regulatory framework, the liberalisation of the seed 
industry has opened up space for debates about further 
refinements in the policy and regulatory environment 
that would further better the seed industry. Strikingly, 
these debates are not very much concerned with 
improving efficiency in the existing policy and regulatory 
framework but rather in creating opportunities that 
would further commercial and political interests of 
certain actors notably seed companies.
Malawi has enacted both the Seed and Biosafety Acts. 
The former was initially promulgated in 1990 but substan-
tially revised in 1996 whereas the latter was propagated 
in 2002. The Biosafety Act is backed up by both a policy 
and a set of regulations developed in 2007. The Seed Act 
provides for procedures of recognizing seed varieties, 
seed testing and inspection, registration of seed sellers, 
import and export of seed, production of seed for certi-
fication, certification seed and seed certification scheme. 
The Biosafety Act legislates against engagement in 
genetic modification of organisms; the importation, 
development, production, testing, release, use and appli-
cation of genetically modified organisms; and the use 
of gene therapy in animals, including human beings 
unless specifically licensed to do. Nonetheless, it is impos-
sible to conclude whether GMOs are acceptable or not 
on the basis of the Biosafety Act. The legislation simply 
provides guidance on how to handle GMO products. This 
reflects the circumstances that led to the enactment of 
the Biosafety Act. The enactment of the Biosafety Act, 
2002 ‘was a function of the 2001/02 hunger crisis 
following the USA’s offer of GMO maize as food aid’66. 
The country did not have a legislative framework in place 
on how to deal with GMO products “but was desperate 
for food aid’67. Under the Biosafety Act, the GMO maize 
was accepted but on condition that it was milled right 
at the port of entry.
The promulgation of the Biosafety Act has provided 
a platform for debate about the suitability of GMO crops 
in the country. While the domestic scientific community 
is divided on the suitability of GMOs, multinational seed 
companies project them as a potential trigger of a 
sustainable green revolution in Malawi. GMO crops are 
depicted as ‘as a key to a possible revolution in the food 
security and prosperity of smallholder farmers’68. For 
instance, Monsanto observed that it sells GMO products 
in other countries, such as South Africa, and that trials 
have been initiated in Malawi. Biotechnology revolution 
is promoted as a panacea for hunger, disease, poverty, 
development and environmental degradation (Zerbe 
2001). The pro-GMO scientists argue that ‘biotechnology 
should simply be understood as a catalyst for develop-
ment’69. They argue that GMO seeds are high yielding, 
disease and drought resistant, traits which are beneficial 
to the farmer especially in the context of unpredictable 
weather and climatic patterns. In addition, GMOs would 
have huge positive impact on the environment since the 
use of pesticides would be greatly reduced. A scientific 
assertion of the pro-GMO scientists is that ‘GMOs do not 
change starch content; they are simply a tool to enhance 
yield levels, disease and drought resistance etc’70. They 
conclude that ‘what Malawi needs is the pre-requisite 
knowledge in GMOs in order to make informed decisions 
and choices’71. For this reason, anti-GMO scientists are 
characterised as ‘lacking good will’72.
The argument of the pro-GMO scientists is that their 
counterparts ‘hide under the cloak of terminator genes’73. 
For anti-GMO scientists, the terminator genes are a key 
exploitative strategy for the multinational companies 
‘since the terminator genes ensure that seed cannot be 
recycled at all’74. This is construed as a huge risk to the 
local seed production and consumption for it would 
destroy the informal seed sector which is so central to 
the country’s farming system. Arguments about health 
risks are also raised. This is based on the fact that ‘we do 
not fully understand the health risks associated with 
GMOs especially since countries that have adopted GMOs 
have not fully commercialized them; they are still doing 
further research’75. Pro-GMO scientists regard this ‘as fear 
of unknown geared toward simply buying time at the 
expense of a possible green revolution which the country 
desperately needs’76. 
The debate about GMOs is therefore far from being 
settled but it has started in earnest. Nonetheless the anti-
GMO scientists’ voice is relatively privileged compared 
to that of their counterparts because of the rather sugges-
tive actions on the part of government. There have been 
several overtures by international organisations to 
MoAFS to experiment with GMOs which have been 
turned down. Examples include water efficient maize, 
cotton and cassava. In all these cases ‘the organisations 
concerned insisted on taking the crops straight to the 
field yet the GMOs were bred elsewhere’77. The official 
line is that if GMO products have to be tried ‘the crops 
must be bred locally and the capacity of local scientists 
has to be built accordingly’78.
The post liberalisation context has raised the profile 
of breeders’ rights in the seed industry. Both donors and 
seed companies argue that the seed industry is less 
vibrant due to the absence of the breeders’ rights legisla-
tive framework. This view is to a great extent shared by 
local breeders and the absence of breeders’ rights legisla-
tion is considered as a huge constraint to the rapid devel-
opment of the seed industry since it does not motivate 
breeders ‘to exercise scientific ingenuity because they 
know their efforts will not be rewarded accordingly or 
worse they will be abused’79. There was, for example, a 
strong feeling that ‘MH 17 and MH 18, which spearheaded 
the maize hybrid revolution, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, might have been renamed by unscrupulous 
traders due to the non-existence of breeders’ rights’80. 
The draft legislation was developed in 2007 ‘but it is 
stuck at the Ministry of Justice; there has not been any 
feedback in order to move the process forward’81. While 
acknowledging the need for breeders’ rights legislation, 
the initiative has been pushed mainly by donors as an 
integral part of a liberalised seed industry. The momentum 
towards the development of the breeders’ rights legisla-
tion ‘fizzled out the moment resources run out’82. 
However, the absence of the breeders’ legislative frame-
work has been exploited as a justification by the 
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multinational seed companies for not working with the 
national breeding programme as a potential source of 
their genetic materials. In the absence of the breeders’ 
rights legislation, ‘the products of the national breeding 
programme would not be competitive in an industry 
where competition through product differentiation is 
the order of the day’83.
3. Input Support 
Programmes since the 
1990s: Narratives, Actors 
and Interests
Malawi is now projected as a model of how to transform 
a rather static smallholder agricultural sector through 
state sponsored subsidies to meet national food require-
ments as well as surplus for export. The key question is 
what has happened in Malawi since the late 1990s 
following the liberalisation of the seed industry and the 
implementation of a succession of input support 
programmes. What do these programmes tell us about 
the political economy of the seed systems in the country? 
The liberalisation of the seed industry coincided with 
a period when Malawi’s agriculture was in a crisis as a 
consequence of the combined effects of the collapse of 
the credit system, the removal of hybrid maize and 
fertiliser subsidies and regular incidents of adverse 
climatic conditions such as drought, flash floods and dry 
spells (Chinsinga 2004; Mann 2009). Food insecurity 
became chronic and pervasive, the economy was tittering 
on the brink of collapse and political parties were offering 
competing packages of possible solutions to the coun-
try’s predicament. So deep was the crisis that donors 
identified Malawi as a major investment country to facili-
tate its recovery through the agricultural sector which 
is the mainstay of the country’s economy. And, in a liber-
alised context, the private sector saw this as the potential 
for growing market given the previously low uptake of 
hybrid and OPV varieties estimated at less than 30 
percent in the mid 1990s (Smale 1995). Donors were 
further persuaded to invest in Malawi’s agricultural sector 
given the centrality of food security in the country’s 
political economy which has invariably become an elec-
toral battleground in a democratic multiparty context.
In the 1989/9growing season the Starter Pack (SP) 
programme was initiated as a joint effort between donors 
and government. It was widely held as ‘a home grown’ 
scientific initiative. However, as the paper discusses 
below, this was overtaken by events, particularly political 
processes, as a succession of input subsidy initiatives 
were rolled out which included SP, Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP) and Agricultural Input Subsidy 
Programme (AISP). These efforts received major political 
attention, substantial backing from the government and 
donors, and involved-in different ways-both the commer-
cial private sector and development NGOs. Given their 
prominence, scale and level of political and financial 
backing these subsidy programmes have fundamentally 
shaped the way Malawi’s seed system currently operates. 
The rest of this section therefore explores how the input 
support programmes have shaped the nature and form 
of the seed industry in a post liberalisation context. The 
analysis reveals that the implementation of these input 
programmes have generated competing narratives, 
creating networks between different actors that have 
either been stable or fluid. These networks have essen-
tially been promoting self interest ‘often at the expense 
of the smallholder farmer in whose name a gamut of 
policy positions or proposals are justified’84.
3.1. Starter Pack and Targeted Input 
Programme Interventions
The Starter Pack (SP) is described as a home grown scien-
tific initiative whose ultimate goal was ‘to facilitate long-
term agricultural change to increase production and to 
enhance soil fertility and reduce dependence on 
imported fertiliser’ (Mann 2009: 7). The SP input package 
was based on the work of the Maize Productivity Task 
Force (MPTF) constituted in 1996 which ‘identified and 
recommended ”Best Bet” seed, fertiliser and legume rota-
tions for all smallholder farmers in the major agro-
economic conditions of the country’ (Blackie and Mann 
2005: 16). The MPTF comprised of members drawn from 
both private and public sector scientists, economists and 
policy makers-and its motivation was to find lasting solu-
tions to address the country’s severe food shortages. The 
‘Best Bet’ agronomic recommendations were inspired 
by the scientific breakthroughs in hybrid maize breeding 
underlined by the release of MH 17 and MH 18 which 
were developed expressly for Malawi local conditions. 
These hybrids met tests for grain texture and storage 
requirements for small-scale farmers who produce maize 
for their own consumption (Smale 1995; Blackie and 
Mann 2005).
The various ‘Best Bet’ technologies had been tested 
in over 1700 farm level trials but the challenge was how 
to move the technology to farmers in order to facilitate 
the envisaged transformation in the farming systems. 
Most farmers could not afford the ‘Best Bet’ technologies 
‘since the majority were poor with about 60 percent of 
them living on less than a dollar a day and worsened by 
the collapse of the credit system’85. The ‘Best Bet’ tech-
nologies provided alternative adjustments to the one-
size-fits all fertiliser recommendation of 96kg of nitrogen 
per hectare described as ‘an impossible investment for 
Malawi’s smallholders, who are among the poorest in 
Africa’ (Blackie and Mann 2005: 20). The adoption of SP 
was greatly influenced by the worsening food security 
situation during the 1997/8 growing season just a year 
before the June 1999 general elections. The government 
approached technocrats for a practical set of recommen-
dations to arrest declining soil fertility and food supply 
for it realised that ‘producing sufficient quantities of food 
was key to economic stability and political acceptance’ 
(Blackie and Mann 2005: 22).
Technocrats seized this opportunity to put on the table 
the promise of the field tested ‘Best Bet’ technologies as 
a way of facilitating long-term structural change in the 
country’s agricultural system. The recommendation was 
that government should extend to all farming families 
inputs adequate for 0.1 ha as described above. 
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Technocrats designed SP as a 5-10 year programme 
during which it would bring about a long-term change 
in farming practices (Smale and Jayne 2003). The long-
term nature of the programme recognized that ‘it would 
take time to effect changes in farming system’86. Inspired 
by the promise of the ‘Best Bet’ technologies, ‘the SP was 
conceived less as a free input distribution programme 
but more as a demonstration and teaching package to 
raise productivity dramatically and foster structural 
change’87. The government enthusiastically embraced 
SP as a multi-year universal programme because it would 
‘be administratively easy and politically attractive in the 
run up to the 1999 general elections’ (Potter 2005: 34).
SP was scaled down to the Targeted Input Programme 
(TIP) in the 2000/1 growing season. The implementation 
of SP generated debate amongst donors who supported 
its financing. These included DFID, USAID, World Bank 
and EU. Unlike the government, donors did not buy the 
idea of SP ‘as a multi-year programme but rather as a 
short-term response to the 1997/8 food security crisis; 
not as a long term programme of agricultural transforma-
tion’88. The debates centred on such issues as beneficiary 
dependency, impact on private sector, agricultural input 
suppliers and cost effectiveness. Most donors were wary 
of the fact that the implementation of the programme 
on a long-term basis would promote beneficiary depen-
dency including the possibility that ‘commitment to the 
programme might be tied to electoral cycles’89. USAID 
was particularly against the implementation of a universal 
SP but would support it if the programme would be 
targeted to those in need. The idea of geographical 
targeting was considered but was not pursued because 
of its sensitivity during an electoral year. This was the 
case because ‘population and poverty distribution in 
Malawi would [have led] to a preponderance of packs 
going to the southern region, the stronghold of the ruling 
party’ (Potter 2005: 36).
While it was argued, particularly by USAID, that SP 
would disrupt the development of a private sector led 
input provision system; the advocates of SP argued that 
these fears were not justified. They observed that ‘the 
vast majority of smallholders were so short of cash that, 
at that time, they represented no market for hybrid seed 
or fertiliser’ (Blackie and Mann 2005: 24). In fact, the 
implementation of SP would go a long way in facilitating 
the development of a private sector input supply system 
since smallholders’ access to quality inputs would stimu-
late them to purchase more inputs in the long-run.  TIP 
switched from hybrid maize to OPV, reduced the package 
of legume seed from 2kg to 1kg and reduced the quantity 
of  basal fertiliser from 10kg to 5kg. SP advocates argue 
that the reductions were not informed by scientific 
considerations but by ‘rather donor driven ideological 
orientations and sheer concerns for cost effectiveness’90. 
In SP, hybrid maize was preferred because it was proven 
ideal for Malawi conditions; the fertiliser amounts were 
based on a scientifically validated compromise for the 
area specific recommendations by the MPTF; and 
legumes were included for their triple benefit of improved 
protein levels in the household diet; improvement of soil 
conditions through nitrogen fixation to appropriate 
levels; and a contribution to household incomes as cash 
crops for which there was robust demand (Potter 2005). 
In TIP, donors considered OPV maize as ‘a key component 
of the exit strategy and potential sustainability because 
farmers would be in a position to recycle seed for at least 
three consecutive growing seasons’91. Unlike hybrid, the 
resource poor farmers would not have to replace seed 
on an annual basis since recycled OPV maize can produce 
consistently for up to three consecutive years without 
the threat of losing yield vigour (Smale 1995; Tripp 2001). 
There was at least a scientific justification for the reduc-
tion of the amount of basal fertiliser to 5kg. There was 
some evidence that the reduction of basal fertiliser would 
not seriously jeopardize yield levels, while providing a 
significant saving on input costs for the programme 
(Chinsinga et al. 2002; Potter 2005).
The evolution of SP into TIP was very much influenced 
by the donor community’s shifts in thinking about 
poverty. By the turn of the new millennium, chronic 
poverty and vulnerability had become development fads 
which resulted in a consortium of donors facilitating the 
development of the National Safety Net Strategy (NSNS) 
as a means of confronting chronic poverty and vulner-
ability on a sustainable basis. The NSNS had four pillars, 
one of which was the TIP. The other three were Public 
Works Programme (PWPs), feeding programmes for 
vulnerable groups (mother and young children), and 
Direct Welfare Transfers (DWTs) (NEC 2000; Chinsinga 
2005). The NSNS argued that a mixture of free, subsidised, 
credit supported and free market options would be 
required to improve access to agricultural inputs. This 
meant that ‘TIP was no longer an agricultural production 
programme but rather a safety net intervention’92. 
According to some former MPTF members, the scale 
down of SP to TIP ‘marked the beginning of the break-
down of the link between agricultural research and policy 
making’93. This was particularly pronounced during the 
2004/5 ETIP. The input packs contained no extension 
messages at all.
The SP/TIP interventions were clearly a technocratic 
design, led by a coalition of local actors but heavily domi-
nated by donors keen on boosting agricultural produc-
tivity and avoiding food insecurity. The SP/TIP 
interventions were allied to the private sector as a source 
of seeds for distribution to the beneficiaries. These 
programmes were later captured by particular political-
commercial interests, which, as described above, led to 
the rampant deterioration of the standards in the seed 
industry. The SP/TIP programmes were captured as 
sources of political patronage. However, the SP/TIP was 
nothing compared to what was to come. The Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) from the 2005/6 
growing season raised the game completely and trans-
formed the subsidy programme from one which was 
largely controlled by technocrats in the state and in donor 
agencies to one dominated by domestic political agendas 
driven mainly by the centrality of food security in the 
country’s political economy.
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3.2. The AISP Intervention
The AISP represents an enormous departure from SP and 
TIP particularly in terms of size of the input packages 
and modalities of distribution. Unlike SP and TIP, the 
distribution of the inputs is done using vouchers and 
the private sector is involved in some way or another 
particularly in the distribution of seeds. The AISP has 
evolved since its introduction in the 2005/6 growing 
season. The major changes between 2005 and 2009 are 
summed up in Table 2.
The magnitude of the government’s subsidy to 
fertiliser has been increasing since the introduction of 
the initiative in 2005/6 growing season. Farmers paid for 
tobacco and maize fertilisers at MK1,450 and MK950 per 
50kg bag respectively. The prices were harmonized at 
MK900 in the subsequent year, reduced to MK800 during 
the 2008/9 programme. The price was further reduced 
to MK500 during the 2008/9 growing which coincided 
with the May 2009 general elections. For the 2008/09 
programme, the price remained at MK500 but the subsidy 
to tobacco farmers was discontinued. The focus is exclu-
sively on maize fertiliser, maize and legume seed.
It is, however, important to note that during the period 
of uncertainty in the transition from TIP to AISP MoAFS 
was considering ways of achieving a sustainable version 
of a uniquely Malawi Green Revolution. In 2005,MoAFS 
developed a road map for spearheading agricultural 
transformation in which it observed that ‘reforms carried 
out at the macro-level have failed to reach their potential 
largely because of the ever-present threat of a food crisis 
much of what is implemented as policy’ (GoM 2005: 1). 
Consequently, the needed long-term change is lost in 
the urgency of dealing with immediate real or perceived 
crisis. Its prognosis was that agricultural productivity can 
only be achieved through the use of improved agri-inputs 
along with associated technologies, restoration of soil 
fertility and an efficient marketing system. 
The proposed strategy was to consider distribution 
of green pack inputs to all smallholder farmers estimated 
at 3.1 million, which should ‘incorporate agronomically 
“Best Bet” technologies…including developing capacity 
for biotechnology research to mitigate droughts and 
other factors affecting crop and livestock production’ 
(GoM 2005: 5-8). There was clearly a hint to return to the 
tested and proven agronomic practices that powered 
the SP initiative. The ‘Best Bet’ technologies highlighted 
in the road map included quality seed designed for 
specific agro-ecological conditions, early maturing vari-
eties to reduce vulnerability to drought, economically 
efficient fertiliser recommendations, appropriate 
husbandry practices and extensive extension advice to 
farmers through a range of media.
It appears that the green revolution initiative was 
completely overshadowed by the panic to address the 
devastating effects of the 2005 hunger crisis. And the 
unprecedented success of the AISP undermined the 
Table 2. Principal Changes in Programme Design and Implementation (2006/7 - 2008/9)
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
Subsidised 
inputs
Maize and 
tobacco 
fertilisers, 
maize seed 
(OPV)
Maize and tobacco 
fertilisers, maize 
seed (hybrid and 
OPV)
Maize and tobacco 
fertilisers, maize seed 
(hybrid and OPV, 
legume seed (limited), 
cotton seed and 
chemicals
Maize and tobacco 
fertilisers, maize seed 
(hybrid and OPV, legume 
seed (limited), cotton 
seed and chemicals, 
maize storage chemicals
Voucher 
distribution 
system
District 
allocation by 
maize areas, 
distribution 
through 
Technical 
Assistants (TAs)
District allocation by 
maize areas, 
distribution varied 
through local 
government, TAs, 
Village 
Development 
Committees (VDCs), 
MoAFS
District allocation by 
farm households and 
areas, distribution 
through MoAFS and 
VDCs
District allocation by 
farm households and 
areas; use of household 
register, open meetings 
for allocation and 
disbursement led by 
MOAFS
Voucher 
redemption
Only through 
SFFRFM and 
ADMARC
Fertiliser distribu-
tion also through 
major retailers; 
flexible maize seed 
vouchers through 
wide range of seed 
retailers
Fertiliser distribution 
also through major 
retailers; flexible maize 
and legume seed 
vouchers through wide 
range of retailers; cotton 
inputs through ADDs
Fertilisers only through 
ADMARC and SFFRFM; 
flexible maize and 
legume seed vouchers 
through wide range of 
seed retailers; cotton 
inputs through ADDs
Other innova-
tion systems
Coupons specific to 
fertiliser type; 
fertiliser buy back 
system; and 
involvement of the 
Logistics Unit
Reduced copies of 
coupons; remote EPA 
premium; and fertiliser 
buy back system
Extra coupon security 
features and market 
monitoring; no buy back 
or remote EPA premium; 
and ADMARC computers 
for voucher processing
Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2009: 5)
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technocratic clout of the green revolution road map that 
MoAFS had been working on. The political hype and the 
international media frenzy made it ‘practically difficult 
to flag alternatives to AISP when it had successfully 
addressed the problem of chronic food insecurity’94. The 
following is illustrative of the apparent lack of policy 
space to champion alternatives to AISP:
…Malawi went from being a chronic recipient of 
food aid to net exporter of maize within just two 
years, bringing desperately needed income to the 
cash strapped country. Not only that, but Malawi 
actually became a food donor to other African coun-
tries (AGRA 2009: 1).
The AISP is widely billed as a tremendous success. It 
has become a model of agricultural policy for which 
Malawi is hailed (AGRA 2009; UNESCO 2009; Denning et 
al. 2009). Since its introduction, Malawi has consistently 
produced surplus maize over and above its annual 
requirement estimated at 2.1 million metric tonnes. In 
all growing seasons Malawi has produced over 500,000 
metric tonnes of surplus maize but the 2007/8 season 
broke the record. Total maize production was estimated 
at 3,444,655 metric tonnes. This represented a surplus 
of about 1.5 million metric tonnes over and above the 
annual food requirement estimated at 2.1 million tonnes. 
Consequently other governments in Africa ‘are contem-
plating taking this [subsidy] path to revamp their agri-
cultural sector against the World Bank’s stance to 
discourage agricultural subsidies’ (UNESCO 2009: 99).
3.3. Seeds and Subsidies 
The apparent success of AISP has engendered competing 
as well as counter narratives about several key elements 
of the seed industry in the country. There is intense 
debate about which would be an appropriate maize seed 
system for the country, whether GMO maize is a saviour 
or slave and the appropriateness of the market or state 
in the delivery of the inputs to the beneficiary farmers. 
These debates demonstrate, among other things, how 
different actors have exploited the liberalisation of the 
seed industry and the implementation of the various 
input support programmes to promote their own inter-
ests either in their own right or in collaboration with 
other actors. In turn, these contestations have shaped 
the current nature and form of the seed industry which 
is dominated by foreign private commercial interests and 
tacitly supported by donors and government officials as 
a result of the coincidence of interests among these 
actors albeit with totally different motivations and goals.
3.3.1. What Type of Maize: Hybrids, OPVs or Local 
Maize Varieties?
There are a wide range of competing views about the 
most appropriate maize seed system for the country. The 
main protagonists in this debate include seed companies, 
donor agencies, NGOs, government officials and farmers. 
There are some interesting coalitions and networks 
amongst these protagonists about what should be 
promoted as the most suitable maize seed system in the 
country. As demonstrated below, each actor is 
determined to promote a maize seed system that would 
best promote their interests. Apart from seed companies, 
the narratives promoted by each group of actors are not 
entirely homogeneous. There are thus counter-narratives 
about what should be the most appropriate system for 
the country among actors, each framed and motivated 
by specific goals and interests that they would like to 
achieve, all occurring in a post liberalisation context, 
underpinned by a rather weak policy environment.
Seed companies have clearly seized on the apparent 
success of AISP to justify the use of hybrid seed in Malawi’s 
farming system. It was, for instance, argued that ‘the AISP 
has been successful because of giving farmers a choice 
between hybrid and OPV maize’95. In this regard, it was 
observed that ‘AISP broke the record during the 2007/8 
growing season when hybrid maize was introduced as 
an option for farmers; the 2005/6 season used exclusively 
OPV maize’96. 
While, of course, acknowledging the fact that OPV 
maize seed can be recycled, it is argued that this ideal is 
not always attainable because ‘OPV yields are low hence 
in the end farmers have nothing to recycle’97. It has been 
argued that the apparent low uptake of hybrid maize 
seed in Malawi is a direct result of ‘farmers not getting 
the right information particularly through NGOs to make 
informed decisions’98. This is justified by taking recourse 
to the AISP’s experiences. When during the 2007/8 
growing season farmers were offered a choice between 
hybrid and OPV maize seed, up to 76 percent of the 
farmers opted for the hybrid (Denning et al. 2009).  
For the seed companies, the apparent popularity of 
hybrid maize challenges the perception of some donors 
and NGOs that hybrid maize is inappropriate for small-
scale farmers. The popularity of hybrid maize varieties is 
a vindication that farmers are able to make informed 
decisions and choices if they are provided with the neces-
sary information. The AISP’s success has provided the 
seed companies with a platform to assert that ‘the hybrid 
maize system is the only system that would ensure that 
Malawi emerges out the hunger situation’99. However, 
OPV maize is predominantly produced by ASSMAG which 
relies on the processing equipment of the seed compa-
nies and given that there are always hitches in this 
arrangement ‘the popularity of hybrids may to some 
extent reflect the scarcity of OPV maize seed on the 
market and not necessarily farmers’ preferences’100.
The discourse among donors about the relative merits 
of hybrid and OPV maize seed is not as pronounced as 
it is among NGOs. Donor agencies are generally indif-
ferent between hybrid and OPV maize seed mainly 
because of the focus on the ‘element of farmers’ choice 
through a market mechanism whether to go for hybrid 
or OPV maize seed’101. However, the EU is well known for 
its preference for OPV to hybrid maize seed for resource 
poor farmers and it has been a major sponsor for initia-
tives aimed at promoting alternative maize seed systems. 
The ASSMAG initiative was supported by the EU 
including various seed multiplication projects of alterna-
tive maize seed systems by both government agencies 
and NGOs. The EU was reportedly instrumental in facili-
tating the switch from hybrid maize seed in SP to OPV 
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maize seed in TIP (Potter 2005). The differences between 
donor agencies are, however, indirectly manifested in 
the views of NGOs that they support in the seed sector. 
The pro-hybrid maize donor agencies emphasize on the 
hybrid maize’s efficiency in converting fertiliser applied 
into yields. They observe that government is ‘rather 
attracted to hybrid maize seed so as to maximise yield 
under AISP’102.
The positions of NGOs on the hybrid-OPV-local maize 
seed are quite diverse. There are those NGOs that 
promote local seed varieties; those that promote OPV 
maize seed varieties; and those that promote hybrid 
maize seed varieties. The main justification for NGOs 
promoting local maize seed varieties is that the local 
maize seed system is sustainable. Sustainability hinges 
on the fact that local seeds can be recycled continuously; 
are pest and disease resistant; familiar to farmers; easy 
to store; amenable to traditional methods of processing; 
tastes better; and can withstand prolonged periods of 
dry spell. Some of these NGOs argue that promoting the 
hybrid maize seed system would be tantamount ‘to 
divesting local farmers of their right since they have been 
custodians of seed from time in memorial; it will be unfair 
to take this responsibility away from them and give it to 
foreigners who are only interested in making profit out 
of local people’103. 
The main concern is that hybrid maize seed system is 
very exploitative to the extent that ‘those championing 
the hybrid maize seed system [are] blinded by the profit 
maximization motive’104; and ‘hybrids are only good for 
commercial purposes; they are not suitable for the 
Malawian smallholder such that championing hybrids 
means that the largest proportion of Malawian lives are 
being put at risk for the sake of few profit seeking compa-
nies’105. The primacy of the profit drive, they argue, does 
not only encourage dependency but also transforms 
hybrids into terminators of both local seed germplasm 
and the financial capabilities of farmers. For many of these 
NGOs, the fact that the farmer has to replace hybrid seed 
annually to sustain the system suggests that ‘the termina-
tors [seed companies] are deliberately blind to the 
poverty of the farmer; they only have eyes for the financial 
and market gains in the poor farmer’106. The Malawian 
smallholder farmer is thus considered too poor to afford 
and satisfy the management requirements for a profit-
able hybrid maize seed system.
NGOs promoting OPV maize are not necessarily averse 
to local maize. But,  in fact, they prefer OPV maize to 
either local  or hybrid maize seed, arguing that ‘OPV maize 
satisfies all the people’s preferences for taste, pound-
ability and storability in addition to being high yielding 
compared to local maize’107. OPV maize is preferred above 
the rest because ‘it balances high disease resistance and 
high yielding traits besides being recyclable’108. While 
acknowledging hybrid maize as high yielding, these 
NGOs consider hybrids as less ideal for poor subsistence 
farmers since it is ‘costly as seed has to be replaced every 
year; a feat which most rural Malawian farmers cannot 
manage’109. These observations hinge on the fact that 
resource constrained farmers cannot afford the manage-
ment regimes associated with the profitable cultivations 
of a hybrid maize system. There is thus no question about 
the high yielding potential of hybrids but for most NGOs 
they do not serve the goal of poverty reduction very 
well. In this regard, it was argued that ‘introducing poor 
resource farmers to hybrid maize is hypocritical when 
we claim to be working towards reducing their poverty; 
hybrid maize does exactly what is written in the bible-
giving with the right hand and taking away with the left 
hand’110. The essence of this observation is that the high 
yields associated with hybrid maize are not authentic 
‘since farmers would have to dispose of substantial 
proportion of the yields in order to get money for 
purchasing seed during the next growing season’111.
OPV maize is considered superior to hybrid maize not 
only because it can be recycled but also because it does 
not require a heavy dosage of fertiliser. OPV maize’s 
fertiliser utilization is 30 percent lower than hybrids and 
as such ‘OPV maize is not a financial terminator like hybrid 
maize which requires that seed be replaced annually as 
well as high amounts of fertilisers in order to realize 
maximum benefits’112. The suitability of OPV maize for 
domestic consumption was also emphasized. OPV maize 
is much more suitable than hybrid maize because ‘it 
produces less husks compared to hybrids’113; ‘OPV maize 
flour makes good nsima unlike hybrid maize’114; and ‘OPV 
maize flour lasts longer than the same amount of hybrid 
maize flour – to the extent that hybrid maize is regarded 
as one of the major enemies of women’115. OPV maize is 
therefore regarded as the ideal maize seed system with 
the capacity to contribute to household food security 
and poverty reduction. 
NGOs promoting hybrids are principally concerned 
with achieving food security at household levels. Hybrids 
are considered ‘as a tested and proven route out of 
poverty and food insecurity since they are fast growing, 
early maturing, and high yielding’116. The question of 
affordability of a hybrid maize seed system is considered 
ill-conceived. It is regarded as a direct consequence of 
‘underrating farmers’ capacity to procure hybrid seeds 
and this is totally wrong and evidence on the ground is 
pointing to the increasing popularity of hybrid maize 
seed even in cases where farmers do not get any form 
of external support’117. The uptake of hybrid maize seed 
is low across the country, it was argued, because of ‘misin-
formation to farmers; there is no any problem with 
hybrids and honestly the hybrid maize system is the best 
option we have’118. 
There are, however, some NGOs in this category that 
are constrained by the nature of their programme design. 
They target primarily vulnerable households ‘for which 
the question of sustainability is out of question; hybrids 
are a perfect option because of their capacity to bring 
about high yields’119. They acknowledge that the provi-
sion of hybrid seed to these households is sustainable 
up to the end of the programme cycle beyond which 
‘households will have to buy their seed on their own; we 
are only postponing their misery since the best [would 
be] to give them OPVs but we are limited by their yields’120. 
The switch to OPV maize would thus affect the achieve-
ment of their programme goals and objectives ‘which is 
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are very important considerations for continued support 
from our donors’121.
Government’s official policy is to promote the use of 
improved maize varieties. This means that government 
is committed to promoting both hybrids and OPVs. 
However, it was argued that ‘there has been a silent switch 
from OPVs to hybrids as the subsidy programme has 
evolved’122. The issue is that government has not been 
consistent in terms of promoting both hybrids and OPVs 
(cf. Smale 1995). It has been switching between the two 
dictated largely by circumstances. For the five years the 
government implemented TIP, the emphasis was on OPVs 
yet in SP it promoted hybrid. The major concern is that 
the oscillation between hybrid and OPV maize is often 
not motivated by ‘scientific considerations but rather by 
circumstantial and opportunistic considerations’123. 
It is, for instance, argued that the inclusion of hybrids 
as an option in the subsidy programme is motivated by 
the primacy of the food security agenda in MoAFS’s port-
folio. Alternative maize seed systems are not ‘favourable 
to the food security agenda even though they are rela-
tively high resistant to pests and diseases; what matters 
is the yield potential’124. The apparent preference for 
hybrids is linked to the primacy of maize in the country’s 
political economy (cf. Sahely et al. 2005; Harrigan 2005; 
Chinsinga 2007). Food security, equated to more or less 
the availability of maize to the masses at affordable prices, 
remains the key electoral battleground. The legitimacy 
of any government is almost entirely dependent on its 
ability to fulfil this extremely vital element of the social 
contract. Politicians are therefore interested in hybrids 
because ‘they want to have something to show to the 
people during the electoral campaign; high yield attain-
able through the use of hybrids is the drive for the govern-
ment, government here as in politicians’125.
Most NGOs observed that that the promotion of hybrid 
in the subsidy programme is not on the basis of MoAFS’s 
technical recommendations but is rather ‘driven by politi-
cians who want to be popular with people there and 
then; our politicians are ‘Chinese’ just like hybrids’126. By 
pushing for hybrid maize and access to fertiliser through 
the subsidy programme, politicians have managed to 
achieve instant popularity but at the expense of sustain-
ability ‘since fertiliser and hybrids are financially 
demanding yet the rural Malawian farmer’s pockets are 
full of holes’127. These NGOs conclude that hybrids and 
fertilisers are ‘politicians’ talk, not technocrats’ and 
farmers’ talk, motivated purely by short-terms political 
goals’128. There could be some truth in these sentiments 
because nearly all MoAFS officials at the district level 
provided a rather telling caveat to the official hybrid drive. 
It was, for instance, observed that while hybrids are high 
yielding most farmers in rural Malawi cannot readily 
afford the associated management regimes ‘without the 
helping hand of Moses [government] in the wilder-
ness’129. The fear is that most farmers cannot sustain the 
hybrid maize system without government’s input support 
programmes. The hybrids are thus being promoted with 
full knowledge of their constraints principally because 
of their high yielding capacity.
Some breeders expressed preference for the hybrid 
to the OPV maize system on the basis of the laxity of the 
seed inspection regime. The justification is that there is 
a higher probability that farmers will end up with poor 
quality seed if they are using OPVs compared to hybrids. 
The laxity in the seed inspection regime exacerbated ‘by 
corrupt tendencies, makes it possible for farmers to be 
provided with fourth or even fifth generation OPVs’130. 
The likelihood of over recycling OPVs is further enhanced 
by the apparent irregularity in the injection of foundation 
seed in the system due to perpetual funding constraints 
facing the national breeding programme. The risk of this 
nature for hybrids is greatly minimized ‘since it is at least 
an established practice that seed has to be replaced on 
a yearly basis’131.
Surprisingly the hybrid maize system is very popular 
with many farmers. Some farmers interviewed for this 
study stated that they consider hybrids ‘the most viable 
option in as far as the fight against hunger is concerned’132. 
They considered hybrids superior to the alternative maize 
seed systems when it comes to fighting hunger because 
they are high yielding, grow fast, mature early and do 
well with little rains. Nonetheless, the farmers did 
acknowledge the merits of local maize vis a vis hybrids, 
observing that local maize is highly resistant to diseases 
and pests, tastes better, easy to store and produces good 
flour both in terms of quality and quantity. 
Farmers’ preference for the hybrid maize system 
revolves around concerns about shortage of land and 
climate change. Land in rural areas is in short supply due 
to excessive sub-division of existing farm-land among 
family members. Hybrid maize is attractive because ‘you 
need more land in order to attain substantial yield from 
local maize while you can harvest twice as much on the 
same piece of land if you use hybrid’133. There is a wide-
spread recognition that climate and weather patterns 
have changed, which in the farmers’ view, ‘makes it risky 
to emphasize on local maize due to unpredictable 
climatic patterns’. The popular view across the eight focus 
group discussions (FGDs) was that climate change makes 
the cultivation of local maize non-viable.
While there appear to be a general preference for the 
hybrid maize system, the majority of the farmers in the 
FGDs indicated that they still plant local maize not out 
of choice but because of poverty constraints. Unlike the 
local maize seed system, ‘it is not possible to get hybrid 
seed from your own granary or beg from your neighbours 
or relations because we know it costs money’134. The 
money constraint is considered as a barrier to the use of 
hybrid maize seed on a wider scale as reflected in the 
following sentiments in the FGDs: ‘given resources, we 
would be planting hybrid maize because it is high 
yielding’135; ‘we plant local maize because it is readily 
available’136; and ‘we plant hybrid only when we get the 
opportunity to access seed as it requires spending’137. 
There are, however, some farmers who plant both hybrid 
and local maize as a risk diversification strategy. This is 
motivated mainly by the changing climatic context 
‘which makes farming an unpredictable venture since 
its either you have too much or too little rain’138.
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There are some cultural myths that render the local 
maize seed system resilient. It is strongly believed that 
local maize makes good beer and it is a secret to a happy 
and vibrant marriage. Men FGDs consistently observed 
that ‘local maize cannot be given up completely; it will 
always be planted as a means of preserving our culture 
because it produces good beer’139. While acknowledging 
that hybrid maize is high yielding and therefore a reliable 
food security buffer, women FGDs argued that ‘planting 
the entire garden to hybrid maize would mean that you 
do not want your marriage’140. Local maize is literally 
described as ‘a marriage builder’ and hybrid maize as ‘a 
marriage breaker’ ‘because hybrid nsima hardly satisfies 
our men’141. There is also a strong belief that hybrid maize 
is commercially viable only when it is disposed of imme-
diately after harvest. It becomes a commercial liability 
when sold long after harvest because it loses weight as 
it further dries up. The strategy therefore is ‘to use a pail 
when selling hybrid maize long after harvest and a scale 
when selling local maize’142. The underlying logic is that 
if a pail is used when selling hybrid maize, then the seller 
is going to make profit. It would thus be a huge loss to 
use a pail when selling local maize because it maintains 
its weight.
The narratives above clearly underlie the political 
economy dynamics of the appropriate maize system. The 
multinational seed companies are quite unequivocal. 
They champion the hybrid maize seed system because 
they deal almost entirely in hybrid maize whose market 
has expanded dramatically following the introduction 
of the fertiliser subsidy programme in the 2005/6 growing 
season. Their narratives are clearly pitched to further 
expand the share of hybrid maize seed by projecting it 
as a potential panacea of the chronic hunger problem 
in Malawi. The donors are somewhat indifferent between 
OPV and hybrid maize seed as long as the procurement 
of the maize seed through the market for the subsidy 
programme is guaranteed. They are obsessed with the 
goal of promoting the private sector as a leading engine 
for rapid agricultural development. However, donors are 
strategically allied with the multinational seed companies 
through their support of the seed component of the 
subsidy programme. They often turn to the multinational 
seed companies as maize seed suppliers since they 
strongly believe that enlisting multinational companies 
would have substantial multiplier effects on private 
sector development through the agro-dealer network 
(Mangisoni 2007; Odame 2010).
Most NGOs promote either local or OPV maize seed, 
contending that the hybrid maize seed system is unsus-
tainable for the typical Malawian smallholder farmer. The 
argument is that promotion of a hybrid maize seed 
system would undermine their goal of poverty reduction 
since it is a requirement that hybrid maize seeds have to 
be replaced annually. They cannot be recycled. There is 
an alliance between NGOs and local seed companies 
particularly ASSMAG who deal mainly in OPV maize seed. 
They collectively condemn multinational seed compa-
nies as being primarily interested in profit maximisation 
and not in the long-term welfare of the farmers. NGOs 
that promote local or OPV maize seed are funded mostly 
by the EU which is a major funder for ASSMAG. The EU 
was instrumental in advocating for the switch from hybrid 
maize in SP to OPV maize in TIP as the basis for ensuring 
sustainability. Some actors, for instance, breeders argue 
that most NGOs favour either local or OPCV maize seeds 
because they offer opportunities for corruption. Hybrid 
maize cannot be recycled whereas local or OPV maize 
can be recycled. This makes it easier for the NGO officials 
to extend to farmers OPV maize seed of fourth or even 
fifth generation.
Government has silently backtracked on its commit-
ment to promote the use of improved maize seeds in 
favour of the hybrid maize seed system. Farmers appear 
to express preference for hybrid maize but widespread 
adoption is constrained by poverty. Food security 
remains the main electoral battleground to the extent 
that politicians are keen on achieving food security at 
all costs. Hybrid maize appears to have done magic for 
the politicians hence it has become a favoured maize 
seed system. The long and short of it is that politicians 
want votes and desire to be food secure at all times. The 
coincidence of interests between politicians and farmers, 
even though for different reasons, has greatly contrib-
uted to the popularity of the hybrid maize seed system. 
Nonetheless the nostalgia for a local maize seed system 
as well as alternative cereal seed system still exists. These 
are desired for cultural aspirations, notably, beer. These 
seed systems are almost on the verge of extinction, 
because the multinational seed companies, which 
control 90 percent of the seed market, consider them 
commercially non-viable.
3.3.2. GMO Maize: Saviour or Slave?
The liberalisation of the seed industry has also opened 
up space for debate about GMO products with particular 
reference to maize which is the mainstay of the country’s 
agro-based economic system. The debate has flourished 
following Malawi’s development of a Biosafety legislative 
framework in 2002. The legislative framework is complete 
following the adoption of the Biosafety policy and regula-
tions in 2007. The legislative framework is, however, 
ambivalent about whether the country is a GMO country 
or not.
The major protagonists in this debate include the 
multinational seed companies, local seed companies, 
NGO and government officials particularly breeders. For 
the multinational seed companies, ‘the introduction of 
GMO maize would be a lasting solution to the chronic 
hunger problems that the country grapples with’143. This 
is because GMO maize is perceived as high yielding, 
disease resistant and environmental friendly since ‘it 
minimises the use of pesticides that have greatly contrib-
uted to the rampant environmental degradation’144. The 
high yielding potential for GMO maize would not only 
combat the problem of food insecurity but also lead to 
poverty reduction on a sustainable basis. GMO maize is 
projected as ‘a key to a possible revolution in the food 
security and prosperity of the farmers’145. However, while 
there may, indeed, be advantages of the GMO maize to 
farmers, seed companies also have their own goals that 
they would want to achieve. The introduction of GMO 
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maize would be in tune with their overall business strate-
gies since elsewhere ‘apart from Malawi we deal in GMO 
maize’146. GMO maize would also enhance the profitability 
of seed companies since unlike ordinary hybrid maize it 
is totally impossible to recycle GMO maize. Farmers would 
have to replace the seeds on annual basis.
Most NGOs and local seed companies are fiercely 
opposed to the introduction of GMO maize in the country. 
They argue that the virtues of GMO maize as a potential 
trigger of a sustainable green revolution are over exag-
gerated. They are described as ‘merely a facade to dupe 
the ordinary Malawian farmer since the management 
regime associated with GMO maize will simply make the 
farmer a prisoner of the multinational seed companies’147. 
NGOs and local seed companies portray the Malawian 
farmer as too poor to afford GMO seed on an annual 
basis, especially in the absence of any input support 
programme. The multinational seed companies are 
condemned as prioritising their concern for profit at the 
expense of the welfare of the poor farmers. These NGOs 
and local seed companies project themselves as being 
primarily concerned with the welfare of the farmers by 
promoting either local or OPV maize seeds. Equally, 
however, they are using this debate to safeguard their 
share of the seed market since they deal primarily in OPV 
maize.
Government officials within the scientific community 
are divided. Some favour the introduction of GMO maize 
projecting it as a saviour due to its high yielding potential 
in which case it would be a lasting solution to the problem 
of chronic hunger in the country. Those opposed to the 
introduction of GMO maize are described as ‘lacking good 
will for the country’148. The fears expressed such as health 
risks and terminator genes which would obliterate the 
local seed system are stylised as ‘fear of unknown’. The 
argument is that what Malawi needs is a critical mass of 
personnel able to handle the cultivation of GMO crops. 
The Pro-GMO scientists are keen to acquire expertise 
that would enable to compete at international levels. 
Regardless of the merits and demerits of the debate, 
each of these actors have their own interests they would 
want to promote either directly or indirectly which in 
turn is shaping the trajectory of the seed industry in the 
country. 
3.3.3. Approaches to Delivery: Market or State? 
The modalities of delivering inputs to farmers under the 
AISP are a subject of on-going debate. During the 2005/6 
growing season when the government implemented 
AISP without any donor support, both fertilisers and 
maize seed were distributed to farmers by two state 
parastatals: ADMARC and SFFRFM (Chinsinga 2007; 
Dorward and Chirwa 2009). Table 2 shows that the private 
sector has been consistently involved in the delivery of 
seed since the 2007/8 growing season and was involved 
in the distribution of fertilisers in the 2006/7 and 2007/8 
growing seasons. The distribution of fertiliser is restricted 
to ADMARC and SFFRFM in the 2008/9 growing season.
Through various studies undertaken to evaluate the 
economic efficacy of the maiden AISP, donors insisted 
on the involvement of the private sector in the 
distribution of maize and fertiliser as a precondition for 
extending support to the programme. The private sector 
has consistently been involved in the procurement of 
fertilisers imports for AISP through a competitive 
tendering process but donors ‘wanted greater involve-
ment of the private sector in both the procurement and 
the distribution of subsidised fertiliser and other farm 
inputs on equal terms with ADMARC and SFFRFM’ 
(Chinsinga 2007: 26). Donors were concerned that the 
exclusion of the private sector in the fertiliser subsidy 
programme would slow down, if not reverse gains from 
economic liberalisation vital to the development of a 
private sector led agricultural growth and recovery. This 
was inevitable particularly in the fertiliser sector ‘since 
effective demand for fertiliser is estimated at between 
300 and 350 thousand metric tonnes yet the subsidy 
programme provides more than half of this amount’149. 
According to Dorward et al. (2007), about 60-70 percent 
of the retail outlets closed as a result of reduced retail 
sales during the 2005/6 growing season. The share of 
private sector fertiliser sales tumbled from 87 percent in 
the 2004/5 growing season to 41 percent during the 
2005/6 season.
The main thrust of the donors’ argument was that 
involvement of the private sector would facilitate the 
diversification of the AISP beyond tobacco and maize, 
which in turn, would stimulate progressive and sustain-
able private sector growth and development. The use of 
vouchers would ensure that ‘non-commercial seed and 
fertiliser distribution are channelled to the development 
of the commercial seed and fertiliser marketing distribu-
tion sectors’ (Mangisoni 2007: 1). Unlike direct input 
distribution, vouchers allow the private sector to expand 
their retail distribution networks countrywide into rural 
areas. The use of vouchers qualifies AISP as a smart 
subsidy since conventional subsidies are known to distort 
the market and crowd out private sector development 
(AGRA 2009). The distortionary effects of vouchers are 
limited because they promote market competition 
among sellers which greatly motivate them to improve 
their services. The use of vouchers serves as an incentive 
for seed and fertiliser dealers to establish outlets in 
remote areas but perhaps more critically ‘help govern-
ment achieve social objectives through commercial 
means’150. The use of vouchers in seed distribution is 
viewed positively even in government circles. It was, for 
instance, pointed out that through the voucher system, 
‘AISP is moving improved seed to more than 1.7 million 
farming families in a manner that is more efficient than 
the government system’151.
Multinational seed companies are considered by most 
actors as the major beneficiaries of the subsidy 
programme because they have a guaranteed market. 
Since the uptake of improved seed is constrained by lack 
of money among smallholder farmers, ‘the subsidy 
ensures that farmers that would have otherwise used 
uncertified seed are able to access improved seed’152. 
Seed companies do have a somewhat guaranteed market 
because seed procurement for AISP is not done through 
a competitive tendering process. Seed companies 
engage and negotiate with government on seed supply 
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for AISP collectively through STAM. The seed tender is 
given to STAM on the basis of the indicative requirements 
for the AISP. Since government buys a substantial amount 
of seed, they negotiate for a lower than market price per 
5kg pack. For the 2009/10 growing season, for instance, 
the market value for the voucher was MK1,900 but 
government offered seed companies MK1,500 per 5kg 
pack. Local seed companies are not able to fully take 
advantage of the market guaranteed by the subsidy 
programme because they rely almost entirely on the 
multinational seed companies to process their seed and 
they often let the local seed companies down.
In turn, seed companies enter into contracts with agro-
dealers to distribute the seed to farmers across the 
country. The expectation is that the seed companies 
would come up with differentiated top-ups when selling 
the seed to farmers in which case ‘seed companies would 
compete on the basis of farmers’ preferences’153. In prac-
tice, however, there is no price differentiation among 
the seed companies when they offer the seed on the 
market. Seed companies do not, however, see themselves 
as major beneficiaries of the subsidy programme. The 
rather depressed government prices forces them to 
‘restrict the supply of seed for the subsidy market, priori-
tizing the non-subsidy markets particularly export 
ones’154. The benefits of the subsidy programme are 
further offset by huge transaction costs incurred through 
voucher redemption. The process is regarded as 
extremely tedious ‘as we have to serialize all voucher 
before we can get paid; we have no choice but to employ 
additional staff to undertake this exercise’155.
There is, however, evidence to show that seed sales 
have dramatically improved because of the fertiliser 
subsidy programme. For the seed companies, this is a 
cash cow since effective demand for improved seed is 
as low as 4,500 metric tonnes out of the possible 30,000 
metric tonnes. According to GRAIN (2010), the subsidy 
programme has expanded the demand for improved 
seed by 5,500 metric tonnes. On average, each seed has 
expanded seed sales by 40 percent while the share of 
the local seed companies has essentially remained static. 
The local seed companies have not fully exploited the 
commercial benefits arising out of the subsidy programme 
because of their reliance on the multinational seed 
companies to process their seeds. However, among the 
multinational seed companies, Monsanto is the major 
beneficiary since it controls more than 50 percent of the 
hybrid maize market in the country.
The involvement of the private sector in the distribu-
tion of subsidy inputs is regarded as a positive develop-
ment by all actors including farmers. The involvement 
of the private sector is justified on the account that 
government cannot implement a nationwide programme 
of this magnitude on its own both efficiently and effec-
tively. Farmers’ justification for the involvement of the 
private sector mainly borders on the nostalgia about how 
an extensive ADMARC network facilitated their access 
to quality inputs (Nthara 2002; Chinsinga 2004). In addi-
tion, farmers were wary about excessive corruption at 
ADMARC markets as outlets for subsidised fertiliser. The 
recurrent concerns were that ADMARC markets are not 
only sparsely located but also that they are captured by 
vendors during the subsidy season. In arguing for the 
involvement of the private sector, women FGD partici-
pants observed that ‘at ADMARC it is only those known 
to officials who manage to buy inputs freely while at 
agro-dealers one is assured of being served in a dignified 
manner without any tension, whatsoever’156. Similar 
sentiments were expressed in a men’s FGD. They observed 
that ‘if it were not for the agro-dealers, the subsidy 
programme would have been a total mess; at ADMARC 
it is only vendors who buy and there is often no fertiliser 
especially if you are not prepared to pay an extra MK200 
or more’157.
It was emphasized across the FGDs that the advantage 
of agro-dealers is that they are ‘near our villages and they 
are a good alternative when we fail to buy from ADMARC 
at least when they are involved in the distribution of 
fertiliser’158. They argued, however, that for the benefits 
of private sector‘s involvement to be fully realised, the 
regulatory framework has to be tightened. This was 
deemed essential because traders are primarily moti-
vated to make profit to the extent that without any sound 
and enforceable regulatory framework farmers would 
end up as victims. There is thus a need to keep the exploit-
ative tendencies of unscrupulous traders in constant 
check by having in place a favourable but enforceable 
regulatory framework.
In this debate about the modalities of input delivery 
to farmers, the main actors include government, donors, 
seed companies and farmers. While there is no competi-
tive tendering in the provision of seeds to the subsidy 
programme, local companies are unable to take advan-
tage of this because they do not have the capacity to 
process seeds on their own. They depend on multina-
tional seed companies against whom they compete. They 
do not only compete on the basis of market share but 
also in terms of the products they offer to farmers. The 
local seed companies deal almost exclusively in OPV 
maize seed unlike the multinational companies which 
specialise in hybrids. The seed companies are heavily 
supportive of the subsidy programme because it guar-
antees them a market for products. Each company 
supplies the programme on the basis of its capacity. The 
subsidy programme offers the seed companies ‘an oppor-
tunity to extend the appeal of their products to farmers 
who would not have otherwise been in a position to 
purchase their products due to limited effective demand’. 
For seed companies, therefore, the subsidy programme 
is a cash cow.
Donors promote market driven provision of farm 
inputs. They have supported the seed component of the 
subsidy programme only on condition that the seeds 
will be distributed to farmers on a market basis. While 
the modalities of the involvement of the seed companies 
in the subsidy programme is not an issue of great concern 
to the donors the methods in which the seeds are distrib-
uted to the farmers is. For donors, the involvement of 
agro-dealers in the distribution of seed to farmers is a 
substantial boost to market development (Mangisoni 
2007). The government is not very much bothered with 
the liberalised seed supply to farmers probably because 
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the seed component is supported by donors. The govern-
ment has held onto to the distribution of fertiliser 
through its two parastatals. The private sector is involved 
in the procurement of fertiliser through a competitive 
tendering process but is entirely excluded from distribu-
tion. This reflects the fact that the distribution of fertiliser 
provides government officials with significant patronage 
opportunities since the whole question of food security 
lies at the heart of the country’s political economy. 
Farmers express preference for private sector supplies 
for both seeds and fertilisers because of rampant corrup-
tion associated with the state parastatals designated as 
official outlets for fertilisers. These competing interests 
have shaped the subsidy programme but largely depen-
dent on the relative power and influence of these actors.
4. The Politics of Input 
Subsidies in Malawi
4.1. Maize Politics = Electoral Politics
The political economy of the cereal seed system in Malawi 
has been greatly shaped by electoral politics through 
the input support programmes that have been imple-
mented since the late 1990s. This is inevitable since food 
security remains at the centre of the country’s political 
economy. For instance, the government readily embraced 
the SP in 1998 because it provided the governing party 
with an opportunity to shore up its legitimacy in the lead 
up to the June 1999 general elections (Potter 2005). The 
country was reeling from the devastating effects of the 
1997/8 hunger crisis. Given the centrality of maize in the 
country’s political economy, ‘the government was very 
keen to be seen to have done something about the food 
security or rather maize crisis’159.
The impact of electoral politics is, however, quite 
pronounced in AISP. The reintroduction of fertiliser 
subsidy as a strategy for addressing the question of 
chronic and pervasive hunger featured prominently in 
the campaign for the 2004 general elections. In fact, the 
distinctive feature of the 2004 electoral campaign ‘was 
that it reflected a strong national consensus for fertiliser 
subsidy, as all leading candidates promised some kind 
of support to the smallholder agricultural sector’ 
(Chinsinga 2007: 4). The differences were only in terms 
of the magnitude of the subsidy and the indicative range 
of crops that would benefit from the subsidy programme. 
The ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) advocated for 
a universal fertiliser subsidy for maize only while the 
opposition block led by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 
advocated for a universal subsidy programme targeting 
maize and tobacco farmers. These differences reflected 
agricultural interests of geographical enclaves consid-
ered as their strongholds.
UDF won the polls but did not implement a fertiliser 
subsidy programme in the 2004/5 growing season as 
implied in the electoral campaign. Instead, it imple-
mented the TIP. The UDF government was somewhat 
reluctant to implement the fertiliser subsidy programme 
as implied in the electoral campaign because it did not 
want to jeopardise its relations with donors. The priority 
of the government was to get an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) so as to kick-start 
economic recovery ‘which could have been jeopardised 
if the government proceeded to implement the universal 
fertiliser subsidy programme which many donors did 
not approve’160. The political events in early 2005 led to 
the president breaking away from UDF and forming his 
own party-the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-which 
did not have any parliamentary representation. The UDF 
was invariably pushed into opposition which created an 
opposition dominated legislature (Chinsinga 2008).
The complexion of the legislature made it extremely 
difficult for the government to resist calls to implement 
a fertiliser subsidy programme. The government’s initial 
proposal was to target the subsidy to maize only but 
taking advantage of their numbers the opposition 
managed to force the government to extend the subsidy 
to tobacco farmers. This was in the interest of the MCP 
since its perceived stronghold is a major tobacco growing 
area. The government bowed down to the opposition’s 
demand because it threatened to use its dominance to 
frustrate government’s legislative agenda including the 
budget. The subsidy programme was extended to 
legume seeds in the third year of its implementation at 
the insistence of donors as a means of facilitating crop 
diversification (Dorward and Chirwa 2009).
Evaluations have shown that the government 
exploited the programme to shore up its popularity and 
legitimacy. AISP has become the centrepiece of its agri-
cultural policy whose main goal is to achieve food secu-
rity at national and household levels (GoM 2006; GoM 
2008). The government further exploited AISP through 
populist pricing of fertilisers. Tobacco and maize fertiliser 
prices for 50kg bag started off at MK1,450 and MK950 
respectively. They were harmonised at MK900 in the 
subsequent season; reduced to MK800 before being 
slashed to MK500 in the lead up to the May 2009 general 
elections. In the third year, the subsidy programme was 
extended to cotton farmers and there were indications 
that it would be extended to coffee and tea growers 
during the 2009/10 season. The cotton, tea and coffee 
growing areas are widely perceived as strongholds of 
the governing party.
This has not happened, however. Instead, government 
has even withdrawn the subsidy from tobacco and cotton 
farmers during the 2009/10 season. The focus is exclu-
sively on maize and legume seed which is often not 
readily available to farmers. This could be attributed to 
the landslide victory of the governing party in the May 
2009 polls. From only six seats in the previous parliament, 
the governing party now controls 114 seats out of the 
193 seat legislature. In addition, the majority of the 33 
independent legislators are aligned to the governing 
side. The withdrawal of the subsidy from tobacco farmers 
is justified as a means of controlling costs for the 
programme but it could be argued that the government 
has now considerable room of manoeuvre because of a 
substantially weakened opposition. Tobacco farmers do 
not have any voice in the government dominated legis-
lature whose perceived primary base is outside the 
tobacco growing areas.
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4.2. Political Consequences 
This paper has demonstrated how competing and some-
times complementary interests in the implementation 
of the three different versions of the input support 
programmes has shaped the nature and form of the seed 
industry in Malawi. The evolution of the seed industry 
has also been greatly shaped by the liberalisation drive 
which has created opportunities for some actors while 
limiting opportunities for other actors at the same time. 
The implementation of the input support programmes 
in a post liberalisation context has created a platform for 
engagement of myriad actors which have included multi-
national and local seed companies, agro-dealers, NGOs, 
government agencies, donor agencies, parastatal agen-
cies mainly SFFRM and ADMARC among many others.
The liberalisation of the seed industry has narrowed 
down the range of crops available to farmers. This is 
mainly due to the nature of seed companies that have 
emerged following the liberalisation of the seed industry. 
The multinational companies, which control about 90 
percent of the seed market, deal almost exclusively in 
hybrid maize seed. Consequently, these multinational 
seed companies do not deal with the national breeding 
programme which has the local seed companies as its 
main client who control only 10 percent of the seed 
market. The fact that the multinational seed companies 
do not deal with the national breeding programme has 
greatly undermined the public sector’s capacity for 
research and innovation in the seed sector. This has, in 
turn, affected the production of alternative cereals such 
as millet and sorghum. The farmer is the main loser. Not 
only are the range of hybrids on offer limited as a result 
of weak effective demand but also farmers cannot readily 
access alternative cereal seed systems. The multinational 
seed companies are interested primarily in enhancing 
their profit levels through dominance of the seed market 
by undercutting the potential development of the local 
seed industry which interacts with the national breeding 
programme but controls only 10 percent of the seed 
market.
The implementation experiences of the input 
programmes have greatly contributed to the creation of 
a situation in which political and commercial interests 
are privileged over social, cultural and technical consid-
erations with regard to fixing the problem of food inse-
curity in Malawi. The transition from SP to TIP was mainly 
influenced by donor concerns about private sector devel-
opment, programme efficiency and sustainability. Yet 
the recommendations about SP were based on a decade 
long scientific effort (Potter 2005; Mann 2009). The AISP 
was implemented in total disregard of an MoAFS blue-
print about how Malawi, drawing from scientific insights, 
that powered SP could achieve a sustainable version of 
a green revolution. The success of AISP has completely 
closed out space for the MoAFS to flag out their green 
revolution blueprint (GoM 2005). 
The major critique of AISP is that it does not necessarily 
denote a Green Revolution. It is simply a return to the 
subsidised surpluses of the early 1980s that existed with 
widespread malnutrition (Mann 2009). Mann’s main argu-
ment is that compared to SP, AISP does not in any way 
come closer to the World Bank’s definition of ‘smart 
subsidy’. Unlike SP, the AISP package is not based on 
scientifically validated propositions. The AISP simply 
represents the brute force use of fertiliser and ‘not a revo-
lutionary approach that changes input/output ratios 
[but] just raises inputs’ (Mann 2009: 1). Mann further 
argues that the appearance of surplus is achieved not 
because basic food needs are met but because the poor 
cannot afford to buy maize produced by the relatively 
non-poor who can access inputs. In the final analysis, 
‘the lack of domestic purchasing power results in the 
surplus being exported, and this is taken as evidence of 
effectively tackling famine; this is reflects a serious policy 
failure’ (Mann 2009: 3). It is a serious policy failure because 
subsidies do not make sense when they support exports.
Furthermore, the switch from SP to TIP marked a 
turning point in as far as the link between research and 
agricultural policy is concerned (Blackie and Mann 2005; 
Smale and Jayne 2003). While the SP package was 
designed on the basis of 5 year long field experiments, 
the TIP package was hugely motivated by cost consid-
erations on the part of donors. This ultimately demolished 
the fruits of a decade’s long scientific effort to develop 
more suitable, less fertilised farming systems. The human 
resource infrastructure that made the development of 
the ‘Best Bet’ technology was effectively dismantled since 
‘TIP functioned [more] as a relief effort [than an agricul-
tural development programme] since the research input 
into the package [was] minimal, if any’ (Smale and Jayne 
2003: 43). The conclusion of these critics is that much of 
the cumulative learning from years of maize research 
appears to have been discarded in favour of short-term, 
crisis motivated solutions (Smale and Jayne 2003; GoM 
2005).
The concern of donors with private sector develop-
ment and the government’s preoccupation with the 
question of food security has created a post liberalisation 
context in which the seed industry is unable to fully serve 
the needs of a typical Malawian farmer. The resulting 
weak regulatory environment has been exploited by 
several actors to further their own selfish interests. 
Politicians exploited TIP as a source of patronage through 
the supply of OPV maize seed to the programme. 
Substandard seeds were provided as a result of laxity in 
the seed inspection regime. Seed companies have taken 
advantage of the rather weak regulatory framework to 
capture the seed market. This has been propped up the 
government’s desire to find a quick fix to the enduring 
problem of food insecurity through the promotion of 
hybrid maize which is the main product for the multina-
tional seed companies. In their quest to facilitate private 
sector development, donors have turned to the multi-
national seed companies as the main sources of seed 
supply through the agro-dealer network. Since donors 
support the seed component of AISP and are obsessed 
with the desire to promote market development, the 
country has increasingly become dependent on the 
multinational companies for seed supply.
The seed component of AISP has become a cash cow 
for the seed companies since they do not have to tender 
for it on a competitive basis. It guarantees them a market 
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depending on their capacity, although Monsanto is 
clearly the biggest winner with more than 50 percent of 
the market share. These developments have invariably 
fostered a narrow political-industry alliance in which 
hybrid maize seed is privileged as the appropriate maize 
seed system to kick-start a potential green revolution in 
the country. This is a culmination of donors’ vision of a 
robust agricultural sector powered by a vibrant private 
sector providing sound advice and locally appropriate 
products through a network of local, independently 
owned and operated agro-dealers or stockists.
The question of exit strategy from the input support 
programmes is not entertained at all especially among 
government officials. The experiences with AISP demon-
strate that there is no way out of the subsidy programme 
because it enjoys popular support in a democratic 
context. It has become the basis for a social contract 
between the people and the rulers. There is so to speak 
a political-economic bind of the subsidy programme 
since the question of food security is firmly at the centre 
of the country’s electoral politics. There is thus popular 
consensus about the centrality of subsidies in combating 
the problem of pervasive and chronic hunger. This is 
difficult for political leaders to ignore in a democratic 
context especially since the subsidy programme has 
become the single most important vote winning issue. 
The differences among political parties are merely in 
terms of the nature, magnitude and target of the subsi-
dies. Although there have been concerns about the 
increasing cost of the subsidy programme exacerbated 
by the sharp rise in the prices of fertiliser, the question 
of exit is hardly contemplated (Chirwa and Dorward 
2010). In short, Malawi is for the time being therefore 
locked up in subsidies without the prospect of exit in 
the short to medium term.
4.3. Winners and Losers
There have been winners and losers from the implemen-
tation of the AISP at two levels. Beneficiary farmers have 
gained in terms of improved yields due to access to 
fertiliser and improved seed which they can hardly 
manage at the market rate. There is a huge price differ-
ential between subsidised and unsubsidised fertiliser. 
Beneficiaries of AISP pay MK500 for a 50kg bag of fertiliser 
when the same bag can be bought at MK5000 on the 
market. The other major groups of beneficiaries are those 
that have emerged as agro-dealers and contract seed 
growers. These are, however, only a small portion of the 
farming community. They do not necessarily represent 
the typical Malawian farmer. They are mostly male and 
fairly richer members of the farming community. The 
majority of the farmers are, however, losers because the 
AISP has either been captured by local elites or exploited 
as a source of political patronage. 
The identification of AISP beneficiaries is contentious 
for two main reasons. First, poverty is widespread in rural 
Malawi and exacerbated by the cumulative adverse 
effects of SAPs and recurrent incidents of droughts and 
flash floods (Devereux 2002; Chinsinga 2004). Social 
stratifications in rural Malawi have more or less disap-
peared making it extremely difficult to identify AISP 
beneficiaries without any contestations. Second, every-
body wants to be a beneficiary of the fertiliser subsidy 
programme because of the huge price differentials 
between subsidised and unsubsidised fertiliser. This is 
inevitable given the breadth and depth of rural poverty 
in the country. This tends to put enormous pressure on 
the village heads because everybody wants to benefit. 
This is regardless of the fact that village heads ‘are no 
longer at the centre of the beneficiary identification 
process but then they have a moral obligation to ensure 
fairness and equity in the administration of any form of 
external support’161.
In the view of local communities, the repercussions 
of the beneficiary identification challenge have been 
quite substantial. It has been a source of tension between 
villagers and their leaders. Regardless of the procedures 
of identifying beneficiaries ‘village heads in most villages 
have a final say in terms of who benefits and does not’162. 
In many cases, this has forced village heads ‘to resort to 
redistributing the inputs to all households once the 
chosen beneficiaries have taken delivery of the inputs 
from the distribution centres’163. This means that the 
beneficiaries on the official list are simply used as conduits 
for the inputs to the villages where they are then 
subjected to ‘a morally justifiable redistribution exer-
cise’164. Consequently, AISP has intensified the breaking 
up of villages which, of course, started with the transfor-
mation of SP into TIP. This practice is on the increase 
because communities strongly believe that sub-division 
of their villages would enhance prospects of them being 
beneficiaries of AISP if some of them can constitute a 
village in their own right. For instance, participants in 
several FGDs at Kadammanja observed ‘we used to be 
one village but now we are three villages; a fourth one 
is about to be established just because we want to benefit 
from AISP’.
Farmers consider themselves as great losers from the 
AISP. They argue that ‘the programme is justified in our 
name but we are the biggest losers’165. For instance, AISP 
provides beneficiaries with three coupons for fertiliser, 
maize seed and a flexible coupon ‘but seeds like ground-
nuts, millet, sorghum, peas etc are never made avail-
able’166. The general feeling is that farmers feel cheated 
since ‘the programme is justified as ours when it is, in 
fact, for chiefs, politicians, extension workers, vendors 
and ADMARC officials’167. Extension workers are consid-
ered as beneficiaries because there is a strong feeling 
that they connive with chiefs to defraud the AISP. In 
almost all FGDs, it was observed that extension workers 
are often found with subsidy inputs. Their trick is ‘to work 
with village heads to convince us all that some benefi-
ciaries were cut off from the list by computers and then 
share these inputs with chiefs’168. ADMARC officials work 
with vendors ‘to make a killing out of AISP’169. The argu-
ment is that vendors are able to get coupons whether 
by hook or crook and ‘when inputs are available at 
ADMARC depots vendors are prioritized at the expense 
of us deserving beneficiaries’170. The vendors then resale 
the subsidy fertiliser at MK3,500. The villagers are some-
times forced to buy this fertiliser ‘especially when there 
are prolonged breaks in the supply chain to ADMARC 
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depots’171. The monitoring study for 2008/9 AISP estab-
lished that some depots could be without fertiliser for 
more than seven weeks after the initial supplies run out 
(Chinsinga 2009). Politicians are beneficiaries of AISP 
because they often use it as a political bait during elec-
toral campaigns. It was argued that ‘politicians get our 
votes by cheating us that they will ensure that we all get 
coupons but they change tune when the time comes’172. 
The farmers’ argument is that ‘politicians are thus often 
convincing but they hardly live up to their promises; what 
matters to them is that they get elected’. The farmers’ 
analysis clearly demonstrates that different stakeholders 
have different interests which play out in the implemen-
tation of AISP. Farmers benefit but the magnitude of their 
benefit is under cut by the rent seeking tendencies of 
various stakeholders.
5. Conclusions
The single most significant impact of the input support 
programmes is that it has reinforced the dominance of 
maize in the country’s cereal seed system. This is the case 
because maize has become an important political crop 
in the country. The food security situation of the whole 
country is entirely dependent on having adequate maize 
and the legitimacy of any government is dependent on 
voters having access to this maize either at affordable 
prices or being able to produce enough of it with some 
kind of support from the government. This has invariably 
created a situation in which the hybrid maize seed system 
is privileged at the expense of other alternative maize 
seed systems including such cereals as millet and 
sorghum. NGOs are, to a very great extent, a lone voice 
in championing alternative maize seed systems, and the 
supportive infrastructure of the hybrid maize seed system 
benefits disproportionately elites at the expense of the 
farmers in whose name the various reforms are 
justified.
Some of the major lessons from this study include the 
following:
 • Politics matter in the initiation, uptake and implemen-
tation of policy interventions. In other words, good 
technical recommendations do not make their way 
into policy or implementation unless there is real 
support from the politically powerful. This is apparent 
in the historical experiences about technical advance-
ments pertaining to maize seed technology. As long 
as smallholder farmers remained disorganized and 
unable to exert influence, grain texture remained at 
the periphery of the national breeding programmes. 
Donors had to intercede on behalf of the politically 
disorganized smallholder farmers. SP was readily 
embraced by government because of a strong political 
drive to find solutions to the rapidly deteriorating food 
security situation and declining soil fertility. The imple-
mentation of the AISP and the subsequent dominance 
of hybrid maize are as a result of political manoeuvring 
to succeed in fixing the problem of chronic food inse-
curity which is at the centre of the country’s political 
economy. The overwhelming political support of AISP 
completely overshadowed MoAFS’s road map which 
outlined how Malawi could attain a sustainable green 
revolution. It is therefore important to fully understand 
the political economy context as well as implications 
of policy processes.
 • National R&D and marketing institutions need to be 
revitalised. The role of national institutions is quite 
critical in developing viable seed systems that would 
effectively and efficiently meet the needs of farmers. 
Public sector agricultural research is in sharp decline 
which has greatly contributed to the near collapse of 
alternative cereal seed systems. Since multinational 
seed companies focus almost exclusively on maize, 
the production of foundation seed for alternative seed 
systems such as millet and sorghum rests squarely with 
the national research institutions. This is further 
compounded by the fact that local seed companies 
are extremely weak. They cannot effectively compete 
with the multinational seed companies. However, 
evidence seems to suggest that no region of the world 
has developed a strong and vibrant seed system 
without strong domestic seed companies (AGRA 2009; 
GRAIN 2010). There is also urgent need for the develop-
ment of a vocal local constituency that can stake claims 
on a sustained basis on public resources in support of 
agricultural research, marketing institutions, and other 
kinds of growth promoting public goods.
 • Science on its own does not really matter. Policy 
change is not only about gathering new evidence but 
about creating new alliances, networks and political 
configurations. SP was backed up by scientific proposi-
tions informed by several years of tested farm level 
trials. It was, however, abandoned in preference for 
TIP dictated by donors who were providing financial 
assistance towards implementation. The preference 
for TIP was not based on considered appraisal of the 
evidence gathered through comprehensive evalua-
tions, but simply reflected headquarters’ led ideologies 
of the agencies, within which there was little consid-
eration of special characteristics of Malawi. Technocrats 
could not flag their road map for a Malawian version 
of green revolution the moment politicians put their 
weight behind AISP. In the road map, there was a hint 
to return to the ‘Best Bet’ technologies as a means of 
kick-starting agricultural growth and development.
 • Incentives and sanctions are needed to ensure that 
key actors work for the common good. Powerful actors 
are primarily influenced by self-interest even though 
these interests are often articulated as being ‘in the 
interest of the poor farmer’. The primary consideration 
of most of these actors is to maximize benefits from a 
policy situation and shift the burden of adjustment 
elsewhere as far as it is practically feasible. 
This study has revealed how gaining access to high 
quality and improved seed at affordable prices is a 
problem for many smallholder farmers, especially in a 
weak policy environment. It has also shown how multi-
nationals have come to dominate the domestic commer-
cial seed sector, propped up by the convergence of donor 
and government interests with those of seed companies, 
albeit for different goals. Malawi’s experience illustrates 
that foreign direct investments, through ownership of 
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production and sales outlets in the seed industry can 
have impacts on poor and smallholder farmers in ways 
that they are powerless to deal with. This becomes heavily 
entrenched if the local elites capture part of the benefits 
especially when these serve the political interests of the 
governing elite as it has happened in Malawi. The input 
programmes, supported by donors in their quest to kick-
start private sector development through multinational 
seed companies, have been exploited as a source of 
political patronage at different levels. The study thus 
demonstrates that business strategies of seed companies 
affect the terms of access to seeds, the affordability of 
seeds, the diversity of genetic resources on farmer fields, 
the income and livelihood of resource poor farmers, 
relationships with agricultural research organisations 
and ultimately the overall food security.
These developments call for concerted efforts to fine 
tune the country’s seed industry for it to serve the inter-
ests of the ordinary Malawian farmer better. The major 
source of the challenges facing the seed industry is the 
weak policy environment following liberalisation, which 
various actors have, in different ways, exploited to 
advance their own selfish interests. There is thus urgent 
need to improve the efficiency and implementation of 
the regulatory frameworks for the industry. Regulations 
exist but they are not enforced fully and consistently. 
This can, however, be done if the relevant public sector 
agencies are strengthened. Both the Seed Services Unit 
and the national breeding programme are in sharp 
decline. Enforcement of the regulatory framework for 
the seed industry is haphazard, and farmers have access 
to a limited range of seed products because the country 
is entirely dependent on the multinational companies 
for seed supply. Consequently, the multinational seed 
companies dictate the nature, shape and form of the 
seed industry. Local seed companies exist but they only 
control 10 percent of the market share. It is for this reason 
that there is urgent need to stimulate local seed compa-
nies which should offer competition to the multinationals 
in order to shape the seed industry in a manner that 
would better serve the interests of the small and rather 
impoverished Malawian farmer. Emerging economies 
such as China, Brazil and India have been able to benefit 
from liberalisation because they had strong local seed 
companies. Multinational seed companies ply their trade 
in these economies mostly through joint ventures with 
successful local companies in which case the products 
on offer are designed with the needs of a local farmer in 
mind.
The study of the three input support programmes, 
namely: Starter Pack (SP), Targeted Input Programme 
(TIP) and Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) 
has demonstrated that policy ideas originate from 
different sources but what ultimately gets implemented 
depends on configurations of the domestic political 
economy context at a particular point in time and the 
interests of the powerful actors. SP was entirely a tech-
nical initiative that was readily embraced by government 
because it was desperately looking for solutions to the 
devastating problem of hunger facing the country. Most 
donors were hesitant about it but had to go along with 
it because it was being implemented around the elec-
tions period. The same can be said about TIP and AISP. 
Donors pushed for the scaled down of SP to TIP not on 
the basis of technical considerations but rather on the 
ideological basis of promoting cost effectiveness and 
private sector development. The initial AISP was imple-
mented entirely by the government without any donor 
support. In the subsequent years, donors have offered 
support to the programme but only on condition that 
the private sector is involved in the procurement and 
distribution of the inputs. The donors are driven primarily 
by the belief that the private sector would foster sustain-
able agricultural development.
These three input support programmes further 
demonstrate that ideas about good policy change and 
evolve not necessarily because of the persuasiveness of 
technical evidence but rather on the basis of changing 
configuration of interests of the dominant coalitions. 
These interests are often couched in rather simplistic 
narratives that appear to suggest problems, solutions 
and consequences if the problems are not addressed as 
suggested. The SP was a consequence of a coalition 
between local and international scientific technocrats 
and government officials. The narrative about SP was 
that it was an input package with a transformative poten-
tial on the country’s agricultural system which would in 
turn be the basis for a sustainable green revolution. The 
TIP was pushed through the coalition of donors who 
strongly believed that SP was not only cost inefficient 
but also detrimental to the progressive development of 
the private sector. It was embraced by the government 
because it offered the opportunity to solve the problem 
of food insecurity as well as opportunities for patronage 
through OPV maize seed supply which was touted as a 
means of ensuring the sustainability of the programme. 
The AISP was entirely an initiative driven by politicians 
motivated by electoral politics. Its subsequent evolution, 
however, has been shaped by the ideological views of 
donors who have argued that the AISP should be seized 
as an opportunity to kick-start the development of the 
private sector in the agricultural sector. In the end, this 
has created coalitions between the state, donors and 
seed companies on one hand and local seed companies 
and NGOs on the other with farmers caught in between 
these two coalitions. The state, donors and seed compa-
nies’ coalition is, however, dominant. It is shaping the 
progressive development of the seed industry that is 
currently characterised by an extremely weak policy 
environment in a post liberalisation context to the detri-
ment of the rural Malawian farmer.
The study has demonstrated that a wide range of 
actors are able to proffer voices and views about the 
nature and form of policies but often the voices and views 
of the dominant actors triumph in shaping policy direc-
tions regardless of their technical plausibility. For 
instance, AISP was implemented without regard to the 
green revolution blueprint that was being developed by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security with partic-
ular focus on how to achieve food security for the country 
on a long-term basis. Opportunities for new ideas, actors 
and networks exist since the context is generally 
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permissive. However, the main challenge is how to ensure 
that these new ideas, actors and networks have any 
significant purchase on the nature and form of the policy 
options in the seed industry. It appears that the only way 
in which alternative ideas, actors and networks can chal-
lenge the existing ones is if a strong locally based seed 
industry can develop in a context of a vibrant national 
breeding programme backed up a public sector that is 
able to enforce the regulatory framework both efficiently 
and effectively.
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